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ABSTRACT
This dissertation focuses on consequences of public policy on consumption re-
sponses.
Chapter 1 evaluates the effect of Thailand’s car tax rebate scheme in 2012 on
household consumption by examining aggregate and administrative data. Car sales
doubled during the policy and dramatically declined afterwards while domestic house-
hold spending was sluggish following the policy, suggesting a substantial dampening
effect of the policy on future household consumption.
Chapter 2 develops a formal model to evaluate Thai household consumption
responses. A life-cycle model of consumption and saving is developed with features
including uninsured income risks, liquidity constraints, durable goods with embedded
adjustment costs and non-homothetic preference in durable goods. Adjustment costs
and liquidity constraints are important frictions in the evaluation of the shorter-term
responses to changes in relative prices, while non-homotheticity captures the income
effect given that cars are luxury goods in the Thai economy context. Key parameters
and the partial equilibrium responses, which are key inputs to inform the aggregate
outcome of the policy, are estimated. The results show that the car-tax rebates had a
sizable impact on slowing Thai household consumption following the policy due to
high level of elasticity of intertemporal substitution among Thai households.
Chapter 3 examines the effect of public smoking bans in the EU countries. Using
individual-level data, this chapter investigates whether nationwide smoke-free laws in
Europe lead to higher smoking reduction and cessation rates among mature smokers.
Exploiting the different timing in imposing smoking ban laws and using a difference-
in-differences approach, I find that light smokers and heavy smokers were more likely
to quit smoking after comprehensive bans were in place while there was no significant
i
effect on average smokers. The results confirm that smoking bans, particularly when
enforced more strictly and comprehensively, lead to higher smoking cessation rates
even among mature smokers with well-established addiction.
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Chapter 1
THAILAND’S CAR TAX REBATE: A STIMULUS OR A BUST?
In 2011, Thailand faced the largest flood in seventy years. In response to the
unexpected crisis the Thai government rolled out Thailand’s car tax rebate scheme in
an attempt to prevent the economy from slipping into a deep recession. This chapter
reviews the program and primary empirical evidence regarding the impact of the tax
cut on household consumption and expenditure. The impact of the policy is primarily
evaluated by examining aggregate evidence and literature reviews. The chapter finishes
by proposing a research method to be used for a formal policy evaluation in the next
chapter.
1.1 Introduction
Many experts criticized the car tax rebate program for its unintended effect of
dampening the economy by putting households in debt. Yet there is no study that
formally evaluates household consumption responses to the policy. While evidence
from aggregate data is pointing towards the dampening effect of the policy due to
higher household debts following the policy, there are other confounding factors that
may contribute to the slowdown, for instance lower income due to the recession and
flood, and tepid global economy.
The car tax rebate scheme boosted car purchases temporarily but affected house-
hold consumption and saving via a number of channels. First, automobiles were
unexpectedly and temporarily cheaper relative to non-durable goods and asset returns,
1
and hence became more attractive as both assets and consumable goods. Households
may shift their consumption intratemporally away from other types of consumption
and intertemporally shift their future consumption towards car demands. The extent
to which households will respond to a tax rate change depends on two key parameters:
elasticity of intratemporal substitution, and elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
This chapter first investigates the direct effect of the program on car sales by
examining aggregate car sales and domestic car production. The excise taxes of as
many as 1.1 million cars and pick-up trucks were rebated during the scheme. A naive
linear projection in car sales suggests a conservative approximation of additional 600
thousand out of 1.1 million vehicles were being purchased during the policy (Figure
3). The car sales data suggests that the future demand was pulled forward during the
program, and cannibalized new car sales in the following years.
Secondly, this chapter investigate the effect of the policy on future aggregate
consumption by examining Private Consumption Expenditure (PCE) data. Personal
vehicle purchases growth in PCE was negative for as many as eleven quarters following
the policy (Figure 4). Assuming no substitutibility and complementarity of car
purchases on other spending, PCE would be predicted to be lower due to future
demand being pulled forward during the policy (Figure 3.)
To investigate substitutibility (or complementarity) between various types of
spending, PCE data aggregated by durability is also examined. The aggregate
household consumption expenditure in non-durable, semi-durable, and services surged
with car purchases during the scheme. The aggregate trend suggests that durable and
non-durable spending may be complementary. However, as private vehicle purchases
decreased dramatically after the program, growth of household expenditure in non-
durable and semi-durable also declined with the durable spending. This suggests
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strong elasticity of intertemporal substitution among Thai households that are willing
to shift future consumption forward due to the change in car prices.
Lastly, this chapter reviews related literature and proposes a research method to
evaluate the policy impact that also contributes to a few strands of literature: namely,
permanent income hypothesis, optimal portfolio allocation between liquid and illiquid
assets with adjustment costs, tax rebates and consumption responses, and elasticity
of intertemporal substitution literature.
1.2 Policy Review
The flood in 2011 took Thailand by a surprise. Not only residential areas were
damaged by the flood, but also were the agricultural and industrial areas. Thailand has
the largest automobile manufacturing base in the Southeast Asia, the Thai government
stepped in to brace manufacturers as well as to stimulate domestic spending by offering
tax benefits to new car buyers.
The car tax rebate scheme offered new car buyers the vehicle excise tax rebates
after one year of ownership of qualifying vehicles. The rebate amount is equal to
the vehicle excise taxes, but not exceeding 100,000 baht (approximately 2,900 USD
at 1USD to 35 Baht exchange rate). The vehicle excise tax rates varied depending
on the types and models of vehicles, ranging from 3 to 25 percent. Specifically, the
excise tax rates were 3 percent for two-door pick-up truck, 12 percent for four-door
pick-up trucks, 17 percent for eco-friendly passenger cars and 25 percent for small size
passenger cars. Qualifying vehicles must be manufactured in Thailand, cost less than
1 million THB, and the engine size not exceeding 1500 cc for passenger cars. The
program opened for interested participants to enroll between October 2011 and 31
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December 2012. However, due to high excess demand, the actual vehicle disbursement
and tax rebate reimbursement lasted into 2014.
The size of the program was enormous, far exceeding the government’s initial
expectation. Over 1.25 million Thais signed up between September 2011 and December
2012, and in the end as many as 1.1 millions personal vehicles were purchased and
excise taxes reimbursed from the scheme. Auto sales hit the record high in 2012 and
2013 during the scheme. The Thai economy was seen at a growth of 7.3 percent in
2012, climbed up from a bottom of 0.8 percent growth in 2011.
From a fiscal standpoint, the program adversely affected the government’s budget
balance. According to a study by Thai Parliamentary Budget Office, the government
may lose approximately 20-30 billion baht from this scheme (TDRI, 2014). The drop
in car sales following the scheme led to a loss in tax revenues while ongoing tax returns
imposed extra budget burden.
Car Prices and Resale Market
The policy also put a downward pressure on used car prices (Chaithongsri, 2013).
Lower new car prices and the rise in used car supply depressed the resale values.
According to the Bank of Thailand, some model-year car prices dropped down below
the debt value that the cars was mortgaged for. Consequently, many debtors defaulted
and let their cars go to purchase a new one at lower prices. The Bank of Thailand
reported that the level of non-performing loans (NPL) rose from 1.3 percent in 2012,
at the beginning of the scheme, to 2.5 percent in 2014 (BOT, 2016).
To monitor the second-hand markets, the Bank of Thailand also started construct-
ing a used car price index (UCPI) in 2011. Figure 8 shows a summary of car prices
from various sources, including Consumer Price Index (CPI) Vehicle, the Bank of
Thailand’s UCPI (on the left axis) and the trend of household expenditure on car
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purchases from Townsend Thai Data (right axis). The trend of price indexes and
household spending per vehicle illustrate the general equilibrium effect of the policy
on new and used car prices. The used car prices started to drop immediately during
the policy, hit a low in 2014. It dropped by approximately 25% from its peak in 2012.
The CPI, which is comprised of only new car prices, also fell by approximately 20%
following the policy.
The average household spending on a newly acquired vehicle in Townsend Thai
Data from 2005 to 2015 is shown in Figure 8. The reported personal vehicle spending
consists of spending on both new and used cars. The average spending per vehicle
roughly follows the trend of CPI prior to and during the policy. Following the policy,
household durable spending per vehicle dropped drastically and largely tracked UCPI.
This suggests that most vehicle purchases households made during the policy were
on new cars, while most purchases households made after the policy were used cars.
Households substituted away from new cars to used cars as the used cars prices
plummeted. However, in 2015, the new car prices dropped to compete with used car
prices and household spending per vehicle bounced back again due to the drop in new
car prices.
1.3 Data
1.3.1 Vehicle Production and Sales
As many as 1.1 million personal vehicles were purchased and reimbursed for the
tax rebate. Thailand’s total annual car sales in 2012 and 2013 were 1.4 million and
1.3 million in comparison to 800 thousands and 795 thousands in 2010, and 2011
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(Figure 1), an addition of approximately 600 thousands and 500 thousands in 2012
and 2013 from 2011. Both pick-up and and passenger car sales surged by about the
same amount during the rebate. (Figure 1). Most of the surge in car sales was likely
a result of the car tax rebate program rather than other confounding factors given
that the macroeconomic conditions were during a downturn.
Car production data shows that the surge in car purchases during the policy
cannibalizes future new car sales, and the policy led to bear markets for both eligible
and non-eligible vehicles following the policy. Figure 2 shows domestic car production
by rebate eligibility. The production of eligible vehicles was significantly higher,
confirming that most of the surge in car purchases was the result of the policy. Total
non-eligible automobile production steadily increase up to 2012, and dropped in year
2013, and 2014. The number seemed to recovered in 2015 but not to the previous
level as before the policy. Meanwhile, the production of eligible vehicles surged during
the policy, and dropped dramatically after. There is also a downward trend in both
eligible and non-eligible car production following the policy.
1.3.2 National Accounts Data
Besides the effect on automobile markets, a stimulus of such a large scale will
likely have significant impacts on the wider economy. This research focuses on the
policy impact on the demand side by examining gross domestic expenditure (GDE)
and private final consumption expenditure (PFCE or PCE).
Aggregate data shows evidence of a large elasticity of intertemporal substitution
among Thai households, suggested by the enormous surge in household spending
during the policy and a relatively long spell of sluggish consumption, negative growth
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in some quarters, for some years following the policy. Growth of private vehicle
purchases was negative for as long as eleven consecutive quarters after the policy
ended in 2013 (Figure 4). PFCE moved closely with personal vehicle purchases, and
had negative growth for 3 quarters after the policy ended (Figure 5). In fact, aggregate
domestic consumption remained slow for at least three following years. Figure 5 also
shows Domestic PFCE which refers to PFCE before adding expenditure of residents
aboard and subtracting expenditure of foreigners in the country. Improved GDE at the
end of 2014 was from the acceleration of Domestic PFCE which included spending of
foreigners in the country. However, PFCE, foreigner expenditure excluded, continued
to decelerate until the end of 2015. This suggests that the recovery of GDE in 2013 and
2014 was contributed by tourist spending while domestic purchasing power continued
to be weak.
Figure 6 shows Domestic PFCE broken down by durability. These are components
of Domestic PFCE, therefore expenditures by tourists in the country are included.
The share of durable spending is approximately 10% (Figure 6 from 2005 to 2015, and
it surged during the policy and quickly subsided afterwards. Yet the level of durable
share after the program ended seem to be slightly higher than prior to the program.
This could be due to the general equilibrium effect that the policy permanently reduced
the user costs of personal vehicles.
During the program, spending on semi-durable was the least affected, whereas
shares of non-durable and services were smaller during the policy. After the policy,
share of spending on services resumed to the level before the policy, while the share of
non-durable spending continued to be smaller. Most of tourist expenditures fall in
the service category, i.e. spending on hotels, restaurants, and transportation services.
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This suggests the that the recovered aggregate spending was mostly boosted by foreign
tourist spending.
Figure 7 shows growth rates of domestic PFCE by durability. While durable
spending accounts for the smallest share in expenditure, its growth is the most volatile.
Growth of semi-durables and non-durables in 2012 and 2013 seems to move in the
same direction as growth of vehicle purchases and durables. This could be due
to the fact that the income effects from cheaper cars were larger than the within-
period substitution effect during the policy. Consumers might be spending more on
complementary goods to personal vehicles during the policy due to the perceived rise
in real income from the tax break. However, following the policy durable spending
declined drastically and spending in other categories also dropped. The exception was
spending on services that recovered in the fourth quarter of 2013, which again was
likely propelled by the recovery of the tourism sector.
In conclusion, aggregate data suggests that domestic spending was significantly
boosted during the policy. Spending in all categories increased likely due to the rise
in real income from the tax break. However, domestic demand remained weak for a
few years afterwards. The following recovery of private consumption was most likely
contributed by external factors rather than domestic.
1.4 Literature Review
Durable spending is one of the first GDE components to drop during a downturn,
making durable stimulus packages a popular fiscal tool during recessions. A car
tax break pulls future demand forward to when the market is supposedly operating
inefficiently at below the optimal level. Temporary tax cuts or subsidies on personal
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vehicles potentially lead to a surge of durable spending during the program at the cost
of cannibalizing future purchases (Mian and Sufi, 2012). However, the sizes of the
reversal effects of the policy on future demand have been mixed. Key parameters to
quantify the effects are the elasticity of intratemporal substitution and intertemporal
substitution.
Thailand’s first car tax rebate program is similar to other subsidies programs
previously implemented in other countries. For instance, the US’s Cars Allowance
Rebate System (CARS), colloquially known as Cash for Clunkers, and the France’s
Balladurette and Juppette’s program which subsidized a replacement of old cars with
new ones. However, Thailand’s car tax rebate program is different from those previous
subsidies in that to receive the rebates, buyers do not need to trade in an old car.
This is because the main purpose of Thailand’s scheme was not an environmental one;
it merely aimed to boost domestic production and consumption via tax incentives.
Since the stock of old cars were never destroyed as required by CARS or Balladurette
and Juppette, Thailand’s car tax rebate program has large general equilibrium effect
on car prices. Furthermore, the size of the program was significantly larger than other
previous programs due to the high car excise tax rate in Thailand.
Previous comparable programs were shown to have different effects. While Bal-
ladurette and Juppette subsidies increased government revenues in the short run
but cannibalized the long-run revenues to lower than the baseline level without the
intervention (Adda and Cooper, 2000), the Cash for Clunkers program appeared
to boost short-run aggregate demand with no or inconsequential effects in the long
run (Mian and Sufi, 2012). Mian and Sufi (2012) estimated that Cash for Clunkers
program pulled future demand from a very near future of only about 7 months, and
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found no evidence of the policy impacts on employment, house prices, and household
default rates.
Aside from being related to literature on car subsidies, this study is more relevant
to literature on tax rebate and household consumption responses. There are many
recent empirical works on tax rebate and consumption responses, Shapiro and Slemrod
(2009), Parker et al. (2013) to name two. However, the car tax rebate operates through
different channels than income tax rebate. This is due to the dual roles of durables
as consumable goods and illiquid assets. Recent studies that focus on household
consumption responses with the presence of durable or illiquid assets include Kaplan
and Violante (2014), Berger et al. (2018), Berger and Vavra (2015).
A permanent income hypothesis (PIH) and rational expectation would predict
households to respond to the price shock by adjusting their durable stock and smooth
their consumption at the arrival of the information about the scheme. However,
due to liquidity constraints and transaction costs, household consumption responses
could be different from the theory prediction. Among the first studies to examine
PIH for durable goods, Bernanke (1984) used panel data and incorporates durable
consumption to test the joint hypothesis. The result does not reject PIH. It concluded
that there is no evidence that liquidity constraints or capital market imperfections
are important in the timing of family car purchases as households can to plan durable
purchases long in advance. Yet the result does not refute that the first car rebate
could substantially change the timing of household durable purchases. The policy
introduced an unexpected and temporary, yet very sizable, price shock to the car
market. Liquidity constraints could become an important factor since the change was
unanticipated.
Later works emphasize the importance of adjustment costs in household durable
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adjustment due to a few observable facts about durable adjustment. First, households
only occasionally adjust their stock of durable goods (Lam, 1991). Moreover, consumers
face lumpy transaction costs, and either fully adjust by replacing their old durable
goods or do not adjust at all (Bar-Ilan and Blinder, 1992). Such behavior is consistent
with a threshold rule or more generally the (S,s) (Caballero and Engel, 1999), in which
consumers adjust their durable stocks only when their actual stock deviates from the
optimal stock by a critical amount.
Many recent works also confirm the importance of liquidity constraints on the short
and medium term consumption responses. Assuming nonseparability in preferences
between durable and nondurable goods, intratemporal substitution between durables
and nondurables will also lead to substantial intertemporal substitution. Previous
studies have shown that due to the intratemporal and intertemporal substitution
between durables and nondurables, consumption pattern and investment in assets in
the short term and medium term predictably will change especially for those more
credit constrained (Cerletti and Pijoan-Mas, 2012). The transmission of income shocks
could be even larger among the constrained households.
Unlike an income tax rebate, only households that adjust their car stocks can
directly benefit from the program. Those who benefited from the first car stimulus
package must be able to afford a car and have access to capital at the time. Liquidity
constraints become an important determinant of the access to the scheme participation.
Furthermore, due to the fact that personal vehicles are luxury goods in Thailand, the
presence of income and wealth effect will also be a critical feature to the model
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1.5 Conclusions
An overview at the aggregate data confirms that Thailand’s car tax rebate had a
significant impact on household consumption, asset holdings and saving. However,
to disentangle the impact of the policy from other confounding factors, such as the
looming recession at the time or low income due to slow global economy, a more
in-depth analysis is required. The next chapter develops a life-cycle consumption
and saving model with cars as durable goods in order to formally evaluate the policy
impact on household consumption responses.
Given the survey of literature, this chapter concludes by proposing features that are
important for a model to realistically evaluate shorter run consumption responses to
the car tax rebate policy. Namely, the model should include stochastic and uninsured
income uncertainty, liquidity constraints, and adjustment costs in durable goods.
Moreover durable goods should be modeled as a luxury good to fit the context of the
Thai economy.
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1.6 Figures
Figure 1: Annual new car sales in Thailand in 2000-2015
Figure 2: Domestic car production by eligibility to the car tax rebate in Thailand
Source: The Thai Automotive Industry Association (TAIA)
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Figure 3: Thailand’s GDE, PCE and Personal Vehicle Purchases in 2005-2015
Figure 4: Growth trend of GDE, PCE and Personal Vehicle Purchase
Source: Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB)
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Figure 5: Growth of Thailand’s GDE and PCE: a closer look
Figure 6: Thailand’s Domestic Private Consumption Expenditure Components by
Durability
Source: Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB)
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Figure 7: Domestic Growth of Private Consumption Expenditure Components by
Durability
Source: Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB)
Figure 8: Personal vehicle price indexes
Source: The Bank of Thailand; Bureau of Trade and Economic Indices; Author’s
calculation from Townsend’s Thai Data: Urban and Rural Resurvey
16
Chapter 2
CAR TAX REBATE AND CONSUMPTION RESPONSES: THE ROLE OF
DURABLE GOODS WITH ADJUSTMENT COSTS
This chapter investigates consumption responses to changes in vehicle prices
induced by Thailand’s car tax rebate policy presented in the framework of a life-cycle
model. The model features durable goods with adjustment costs and non-homothetic
preference in order to match the fact that cars are luxury goods in Thailand. Given
that car purchases are lumpy and infrequent, liquidity constraints and adjustment
costs are important features for the evaluation of shorter-run consumption responses.
The non-homothetic preference also generates heterogeneous responses to the policy,
varied by income and wealth of households. Findings show that Thai households
have large elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS), hence large responses to the
fiscal stimulus. In particular, the model predicts that the temporary price shock will
lead to a large cutback in future consumption, consistent with the evidence shown by
aggregate data.
2.1 Introduction
The car tax rebate scheme boosted car purchases by making prices of cars unex-
pectedly and temporarily cheaper relative to non-durable goods and asset returns.
Through this tax rebate, cars became more attractive consumable goods and assets,
and consequently affected household consumption decisions both intratemporally and
intertemporally. This chapter focuses on developing a model that matches important
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features of car purchases, namely that they are large, infrequent, and that cars func-
tion as a luxury good. The study then focuses on estimating parameters that are
relevant to EIS to quantify household consumption responses to the policy. These key
parameters are not only important for the evaluation of the car tax rebate program
but also quantitatively informative for future economic policy decisions.
The tax break on cars operates through a number of channels: 1) substitution
effects due to the changes in relative prices that lead to both intratemporal and
intertemporal substitution in a dynamic setting; 2) income effects as cars become less
expensive and demand for cars and other goods weakly increases; and 3) wealth effects
since the tax break may influence car resale prices and cars also function as illiquid
assets or "buffer stocks" for households. To evaluate the policy impact, this chapter
proposes a model with two goods, non-durable and durable, with an emphasis on the
dual roles of durable goods as 1) long-lived consumable goods, and 2) assets storing
wealth that depreciate over time. Furthermore, to model cars as durables within the
context of the Thai economy, non-durable goods are a necessity while durable goods
are a luxury.
The framework of heterogeneous agents in the life-cycle model also allows for the
evaluation of the policy on households with various ages, income, and wealth. In
the model, households will face uninsurable income risks, liquidity constraints, and
adjustment costs of durable goods. The presence of adjustment costs and liquidity
constraints are essential for the evaluation of consumption responses to the policy
in the shorter run. The model parameters are estimated to match a rich panel of
micro-level data, the Townsend Thai data. Model parameters are estimated using
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) to match moments of assets, consumption,
rates of car ownership, and the probability of durable adjustment from household-level
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data. The estimation places emphasis on relevant parameters to quantify EIS of Thai
households.
In this study, the model generates heterogenous EIS and consumption responses
to the car tax rebate among households. The varying EIS among households with
different levels of wealth and income are generated from the income effect given
the non-homothetic preference. Low income (wealth) households do not own a car,
and only do so when they reach sufficiently high level of income (wealth). Relevant
parameters in the structural model are heterogeneous responses at various income,
wealth, and age levels are numerically calculated from simulations. The results are
consistent with recent works that use GMM approach that found EIS to be well above
1 (Hansen et al., 2007; Barro, 2009; Bansal et al., 2012; Gruber, 2013).
This chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 presents related literature in EIS
estimation. Section 2.3 explains the model, and discusses the model solution and
the interpretation of model parameters. Section 2.4 discusses estimation strategy by
first explaining the Thai household data, which is used to match model variables and
estimate model parameters. Then the section proceeds with estimation results and
identification. Section 2.5 presents a simulation that tests the model prediction of
the car tax rebate policy on the Thai economy. In Section 2.6, alternative policy
experiments, including a consumption tax break and income tax break, are conducted.
2.2 Related Literature
EIS generally measures the willingness of consumers to substitute between periods,
given a change in prices of consumption or asset returns. It is a crucial input to
determine household responses to various fiscal stimuli. This study fills a gap in the
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literature by focusing on estimating EIS in a structural model with adjustment costs
and non-homothetic preference in durable goods.
There has been a wide range of EIS used and estimated in the past. Estimates
of EIS vary across countries, wealth levels and depend upon an inclusion of durable
goods in data. In the macroeconomic literature empirical studies using aggregate
consumption data typically find EIS to be close to zero. While other models that are
designed to match growth and fluctuation generally would need EIS to be close to
one (Guvenen, 2006).
The wide EIS range among countries can be reconciled with two main types of
heterogeneity: stock market participation and wealth. Blundell et al. (1994) and
Attanasio and Weber (1995) suggest that rich households tend to show a larger EIS.
Furthermore, households with high wealth– generally also stockholders– are found to
have high EIS while households with low wealth are found to have lower EIS (Guvenen,
2006; Havranek et al., 2015). Havranek et al. (2015) found that countries with low
participation in stock markets display a smaller value of elasticity. The mean estimates
reported in empirical studies is 0.5 (Havranek et al., 2015).
The inclusion of durable goods also significantly affects EIS estimates. Early
and influential work by Hall (1988) found EIS to be close to zero indicating that
consumption changes very little in response to a change in real interest rates. Mankiw
et al. (1985) enriched the model by introducing the service flow from consumer durables
with a linear Engel curve in the model and found EIS for durable goods close to
one. Ogaki and Reinhart (1998) used the innovative cointegration method, which is
robust to the adjustment costs, and assumed non-separability between non-durables
and durables. They estimated EIS to be around 0.32-0.45 with CES utility function
specification. Recent work by Havránek (2015) extends the work of Ogaki and Reinhart
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by incorporating non-homotheticity for durable goods in order to account for the
potential income effect. He found that EIS of total consumption to be small (weighted
average of the consumption basket with negligible EIS for nondurables and significant
EIS for durables).
A long line of literature has acknowledged the key role that adjustment costs
play in consumption of durable goods (Bernanke, 1984; Eberly, 1994; Grossman and
Laroque, 1987; Lam, 1991). Adjustment costs and liquidity constraints will play a
key role for work interested in shorter run consumption responses. More recent and
prominent papers that model durable consumption or illiquid assets with transaction
costs (Berger et al., 2015; Kaplan and Violante, 2014) have refrained from estimating
the EIS parameters and assume a common value of parameters in the literature. My
study fills the gap in the literature by incorporating adjustment costs in the structural
model and focus on estimating the EIS parameters.
The key parameters that influence EIS in the context of the model in this study
are the curvature of the utility function and non-homotheticity. These two parameters
together with the durable adjustment costs in the model generate heterogeneity in
EIS and non-linear household consumption responses. The model has features that
match the empirical evidences that car purchases are infrequent and lumpy (Lam,
1991; Eberly, 1994), and that the Engel curve of durable consumption is nonlinear
(Havránek, 2015).
Due to the rich features of the model there is no closed-form solution for EIS. For
a model with stochastic income, the literature has mostly used the Euler’s equation
method to estimate EIS rather than estimating relevant parameters in a model
directly (Attanasio and Weber, 2010). The Euler’s equation is robust to the presence
of adjustment costs, albeit only the long run. However, the shorter run responses are
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of great interest to policy makers and are affected by the adjustment cost. Instead of
the Euler’s equation method, this study uses a direct parameter estimation from a
structural model.
More recent works with GMM approach to estimate EIS instead of a regression
approach found the elasticity to be above 1 (Hansen et al., 2007). Another strand of
literature that estimates EIS is the asset pricing literature. Two recent approaches,
the long-run risk hypothesis (Bansal and Yaron, 2004) and the rare disasters model
(Barro, 2009) showed that EIS needs to be above 1 to replicate consumption volatility
and asset prices in data. Bansal et al. (2012) discusses that the low estimates of EIS
from the regression method could be severely downward biased due to measurement
error in the real rate, or endogeneity bias from omitted variables that correlate with
consumption volatility or the real interest rates. Gruber (2013) address endogenity bias
by exploiting exogenous differences in capital income tax rates and found estimates to
be around 2.
2.3 Model
Households consume two types of goods: non-durables and durables, accumulate
risk-free assets as well as durable goods, and are able to borrow within borrowing
constraints. Durable goods serve dual roles: providing a stream of services, and storing
wealth. For the purpose of evaluating Thailand’s car tax rebate policy, durable goods
in this study are only comprise of household personal vehicles, including passenger
cars and pick-up trucks (henceforth referred to as cars for brevity).
In other related studies, durable goods generally include housing, personal vehicles,
and other board durables. The inclusion of data depends on the research question.
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This study includes only cars as household durable goods with incurred adjustment
costs to evaluate the car tax rebate policy and estimate relevant parameters for Thai
household preferences with respect to cars. However, in order to accurately capture
the wealth of households, household assets in the model consist of both household
liquid and fixed assets. The majority of household fixed assets are in the form of
land and housing (Table 2). Relative to cars, wealth stored in land and housing
is much more accessible. Land and housing can be liquidated by collateralization
relatively easily given the model period of one year. Therefore, the inclusion of all
household fixed assets, besides cars, as household wealth that can be accessed without
adjustment costs is fairly innocuous.
Liquidity constraints and adjustment costs are crucial in generating shorter-run
responses to unexpected price changes. The adjustment costs of personal vehicles in
the model encompasses relevant costs in resaling, such as the time cost, registration
fees, and asymmetric information costs. Without the adjustment costs, households
will adjust their cars every period and all the car owners would have participated in
the car tax rebate policy. Liquidity constraints are another important friction for the
car adjustment, so that households without sufficient asset or income cannot purchase
a car due to limited access to credit.
2.3.1 Setting
Households live for 60 periods, j = 1, ..., 60, representing households age of 26 to
85. This is measured by the age of the head of the household in data. They consume
two goods: non-durable goods and a stream of services from durable goods, Cit, and
Dit respectively in each period while receiving exogenous stochastic income of Yit.
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They also store their wealth in two assets: a risk-free asset with no adjustment costs,
Ait, and durable goods, Dit. A household maximizes the expected utility function
Et[Σ
J
j=1β
jU(Ci,t+j, Di,t+j) + β
J+1B(Wit+J+1)]
where B(.) is the value of terminal wealth in period 60.
2.3.1.1 Preferences
In each period, a household consumes two types of goods, non-durable goods and
service flow from durable goods. The stream of service flow is proportional to the
size of durable, consistent with the standard assumption in the literature. Cars are
luxury goods in Thailand, so the preference is assumed to be non-homothetic in car
consumption to capture the non-linear Engle curve in durable spending.
When EIS is the main research interest, non-separability in durable goods and
non-durable goods could be a concern. If the intratemporal substitution effect between
durable and non-durable is strong, assuming additive separability between them will
lead to a bias in estimation of EIS. The standard practice, pioneered by Ogaki and
Reinhart (1998), is to assume the standard CES functional form and estimate the
intratemporal substitution parameters. This study chooses the Cobb-Douglas utility
function, which is equivalent to the CES utility function with the intratemporal
substitution of 1, as a benchmark for two reasons. First, the estimates of elasticity
between non-durables and durables in the literature are not statistically different from
1 (Berger and Vavra, 2015). Second, the Cobb-Douglas utility function is chosen as a
benchmark to be consistent with the most recent works in the literature on household
durable goods with adjustment costs (Berger and Vavra, 2015; Berger et al., 2015;
Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger, 2011).
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Households are assumed to have a per-period Cobb-Douglas utility function as
follows:
U(Cit, Dit) =
1
1− σ (C
α
it(Dit + τ)
1−α)1−σ
Non-homotheticity in the preference distinguishes this study from closely related
studies. In a static setting with no asset accumulation and deterministic income, the
share of durable and nondurable goods demand is constant for any given level of
income. In other words, there is no income effect. Adding the τ parameter in the
utility function allows for the income effect in durable goods: allowing the income
expansion path to be non-linear in cars. Households with sufficiently low income (or
wealth) will have the share of nondurable to durable goods at 1:0. When household
asset holding or income is sufficiently high, the ratio of C : D+ τ is equal to α : 1−α.
As income rises, the ratio of C : D will converge to α : 1−α. In a dynamic setting, the
ratio of C : D could be different as governed by the intertemporal and intratemporal
marginal utility conditions.
With the Cobb-Douglas utility function specification, the intratemporal substitu-
tion parameter is assumed to be equal to 1. However, with non-homotheticity in the
preference, the intratemporal substitution varies among households according their
wealth and income level relative to the non-homotheticity parameter. Low-income
(wealth) households have relatively low intratemporal substitution, holding real income
constant they may not change their durable consumption as relative prices of car
change.
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2.3.1.2 Income Process
Households face an exogenous and stochastic income process. Household i at time
t is at the age jit has the income process as the following:
Yit = exp{χ(jit) + yit},
throughout the life-cycle, where yi,t is the residual income, and χ(jit) is the deter-
ministic age-dependent parameter. zit is household permanent shock that follows an
AR(1) process below:
yit = zit + εit
zit = ρzit−1 + µit.
2.3.1.3 Per-period Budget Constraint and Adjustment Costs
The per-period budget constraint without adjustment costs is
Cit + Pt(Dit − (1− δ)Dit−1) + Ait = Yit + (1 + r)Ait−1.
The adjustment costs incur only if households decide to adjust their durable
level. Two types of adjustment costs are included: the proportional adjustment costs
(Fv) and fixed adjustment costs (Fo). The proportional adjustment cost, Fv, is the
transaction cost that is proportional to the value of cars being sold. It captures the
time and psychic costs of selling a car, as well as the possible loss in value due to
asymmetric information. Note that the cost only depends on the size of existing
durable, not the new purchase. This will give a policy rule that depends only on the
state variable, and not on the choice variable. Moreover, an additional fixed cost, Fo,
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is included to capture the value-invariant costs of selling a car, such as title transfer
and license registration fees.
Both types of adjustment costs are effective in creating infrequent adjustment
of durable goods. However, the proportional adjustment cost will result in a policy
function that is dependent on the size of state variable, D, while the fixed adjustment
cost allows for varying frequency of adjustment among wealthy and poor households.
The proportional adjustment cost enters the first order condition directly, and affects
households with varying level of wealth by the same extent. On the other hand, the
fixed adjustment costs do not enter the first order condition, but it has what is akin
to a wealth effect. The fixed adjustment cost will create a varying degree of frequency
of adjustment depending on household wealth level. Having two types of adjustment
cost parameters will allow for flexibility in matching aggregated moments of frequency
of adjustment among households with different levels of income.
The total adjustment cost given durable holding Dt−1 is equal to
F = FvPtDt−1 + Fo
2.3.1.4 Terminal Value of Wealth
Townsend Thai data reveals that Thai households still hold a high level of assets
even if they are near the end of life. The lack of asset deaccumulation indicates that
households may have bequest motives, or in general they value having some assets at
the end of their lives. In order to match this empirical observation, households are
assigned a terminal wealth value.
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For simplicity, I maintain the structure of the utility function and assigned a
scaling parameter, ψ, as the terminal wealth value function:
VT = ψ
[(AT )
α(DT + τ)
1−α]1−σ
1− σ
2.3.1.5 Recursive Form
The household dynamic problem described above can be written in a recursive form
as follows. Let the set of state variables s ≡ (A,D, z, j). The state variables include
household wealth, durable holding, permanent income shock and age, respectively. In
each period, households face a decision of whether or not to adjust their durable stocks.
The discrete decision is made by comparing the optimal value of each sub-problem.
Households face different budget constraints depending on whether they adjust their
durable holding. In each sub problem, they also face the liquidity constraints and
nonzero consumption constraints.
The value function given state variables is
Vt(s) = max{V adjustt (s), V no adjustt (s)}
.
Households solve the following dynamic problem if they adjust their durable
holding:
For t = 1, ..., 60 :
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V adjustt (s) = maxC,A′,D′ U(C,D
′) + βE[Vt+1(s′)|z]
s.t. A′ + PD′(1 + τd) + C(1 + τc) = (1 + r)A+ y(z)(1− τy) + (1− Fv)(1− δ)PD − Fo
A′ ≥ At+1
D′ ≥ 0
C ≥ 0
s′ = (A′, D′, z′, j + 1).
Where τd, τc, and τy are the (effective) tax rates on cars, non-durable goods, and
labor income. There are two choice variable, A′ and D′ if households adjust their
durable consumption, and C is complying with the per-period budget constraint and
the nonzero constraint. D′ is nonzero but can be lower than the previous durable
stock net depreciation (D(1− δ)) if households are selling their durable goods as a
buffer stock and adjusting their durable level downward when they experience negative
shocks.
Households solve the following program if they do not adjust their durable holding:
V no adjust(s) = maxC,A′ U(C,D) + βE[V (s
′)|z]
s.t. A′ + C(1 + τc) = (1 + r)A+ y(z)(1− τy)− δPD
A′ ≥ At+1
C ≥ 0
s′ = (A′, (1− δ)D, z′, j + 1).
Households will make an adjustment decision by choosing the option with higher
value function at given state variables.
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2.3.2 Model Solution
The model is solved backwards from the terminal period. In each period, two
problems are solved for the adjust and non-adjust cases. The value functions of the
two problems are compared for given state variables and the solution with higher
values is the solution for that set of state variables.
In the non-adjustment case, households continue to consume the existing levels of
durables net depreciation from the previous period. A household essentially has one
choice variable in this case, the non-durable consumption. The next period asset will
be according to the budget constraint. At a given durable level, the next period level
of asset or nondurable consumption is chosen to optimize the problem according to
the intertemporal first order condition for interior solutions. Corner solutions may
occur in the cases of either binding liquidity constraints, or zero consumption.
In the case of durable adjustments, households have two choice variables: durable
and non-durable consumption. The two choices variables will be determined by two
first order conditions that dictate the intratemporal and intertemporal substitution.
Similarly, corner solutions for either binding liquidity constraints and/or positive
consumption levels are considered.
According to the utility function specification, households have −inf utility if its
non-durable consumption is zero. Besides the imposed borrowing constraints, A, this
feature of the utility function imposes a natural borrowing constraint on the asset
level that households will avoid because they are heavily penalized when they cannot
afford positive non-durable consumption.
The solution resembles the (S,s) bands optimal rule. To visualize the solution to
this problem, it is useful to think of the solution to the model without adjustment
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cost as a benchmark. If households can adjust their stock of cars costlessly, they will
re-optimize their durable level every period given the two first order conditions and
constraints. For a given set of state variables there is an optimal level of durable
goods, D∗(A,D, j, z) and asset, A′∗(A,D, j, z), that solve the problem V adjust with no
adjustment cost. The introduction of adjustment costs essentially creates an inaction
band around this optimal point D∗. The larger the adjustment costs, the larger the
band is going to be. At a given set of state variables, households will adjust when
their durable levels become too low or too high outside of the inaction band.
Given a level of asset, a household will adjust durable upwards when the level of
durable becomes too low, generally as durable depreciates over time. A household
may also adjust its durable level downward in the case that its asset level become too
low, possibly due to negative shocks. Durable goods essentially function like a buffer
stock for the household. On the other hand, if there is a sufficiently large positive
shock, a household will adjust its durable stocks upwards.
An example of a policy function given a state space of (A,D) is illustrated in
Figure 9. The flat plane in the middle illustrates the area of (A,D) that households
will not adjust their durable. In the right corner is where households will adjust the
durable level upward, when a given level of D is too low for the level of asset. On the
other hand, the left corner shows the area of the state space (A,D) that households
adjust their durable downwards. When their asset levels are too low, households resort
to selling cars as if it is a buffer stock.
Figure 10 illustrates a level set of policy function of durable adjustment decision
for 55-year-old households (t = 30), given that their permanent shock is 0 (so they
are at a mean income). The level set shows the household policy function at different
asset levels. First, if households have low assets and are very close to the liquidity
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constraints, A = −198, the policy function is to sell all the durable goods except for
where their durable levels are extremely low and may not cover the fixed adjustment
cost. If their durable holding is too high, the policy function is to liquidate existing
durable goods and adjust the level of the durable holding downward. For a household
with a low level of assets but sufficiently far away from the borrowing constraint,
A = 10, the policy function is to not adjust and keep consuming the existing level
of durable goods. As the level of wealth rises, the demand for durable goods rises.
Households with higher levels of wealth will have larger areas of adjustment, that
is the lower-bound threshold of durable in the inaction band will be higher as their
wealth rises.
Figure 11 illustrates a level set of durable demand at different ages, given a level of
assets at 200 and permanent shock z = 0. Demand for durables rises with age. Given
the same level of asset, the desired durable holding is larger as households grow older
due to diminishing precautionary saving incentives as they are closer to the end of the
life cycle. The level of desired durables exceeds the actual asset holding due to the
fact that households are allowed to borrow and durables are long lasting and provide
a stream of services over time. Furthermore, in order to avoid frequent adjustment,
households have incentive to purchase larger stocks of durables to avoid adjustment
costs.
2.3.3 Computation
To compute the policy function and value function, I solved the model backwards
from the terminal period. The state space for durable goods and assets is discretized
to 30 grids each: a1, a2, ..., a30×d1, d2, ...d30. The value of the maximum and minimum
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grids in each period of the life cycle is based on the range of asset and durable holdings
at each age from Townsend Thai data. The permanent shocks are also discretized into
9 states using the Tauchen method. The policy function is then evaluated at each
state variable on the grids, although the solutions are not restricted to the same grids.
Due to the highly discontinuous nature of the value function, I solve the dynamic
problem by using a brute-force grid search. Details on the steps to solve the model
are as follows.
1. The terminal period assets are constrained to be non-negative. The last period
solution is solved given the terminal period function of wealth.
2. Given the state variables, the non-adjust problem in period 60 is solved by
searching over next period asset values. First, the cash on hand available given
that the household will not adjust durable level is computed. The cash on hand
is then discretized into fine grids and the solutions are searched over the grids.
Nondurable consumption is computed by per-period budget constraint and is
constrained to nonzero value. The grid of next period asset level is constructed so
that nondurable consumption is nonzero. If the implied consumption is negative
given the cash on hand, a big negative value is assigned to the value function
with a larger negative value when the asset is more negative. The solution is
the grid that yields the highest value.
3. A similar procedure is followed for the adjust case. However, now there are two
variables to search over: the levels of adjusted durable goods and assets. To
solve for the adjust case the cash on hand given that existing durable goods are
sold is calculated. The cash on hand then is discretized into fine grids to search
over next period asset level. For each grid of the next period asset level, a set of
fine grids of possible adjusted durables is constructed given that consumption
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level must be positive. The level of consumption is computed by the per-period
budget constraint. The solution is the grid that yields the highest value.
4. For each set of state variables, the value functions between the two cases are
compared to decide whether households will adjust the durable levels. Value
function for t = 60 is stored.
5. Solve the model for t = 59, following the same procedure. The new set of grids
of state variables are calculated according to data. The values of continued
value function over the fine grids that are searched are calculated using linear
interpolation.
6. Repeat the process for t = 58, ..., 1 following the same procedure.
Extrapolation: To allow for solution in t to fall outside the maximum value of the
already specified grids in t+ 1, extra grids with very large values of asset and durable
levels are added and solved for to allow for the solution in t+ 1 to be extrapolated.
Solutions that fall outside the grids specified for period t+ 1 are estimated by using
linear interpolation to the value at the extra grids.
The algorithm is vectorized to maximize efficiency. The total time to solve the
model for one set of parameters is approximately five minutes using Matlab. To
estimate model parameters, the program is set up for parallel computing to search over
parameters. The program uses Matlab software over supercomputing facility (HPC)
provided by Research Computing, Arizona State University. It takes approximately 2
days to estimate one set of parameters.
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2.3.4 Interpretation of Parameters
The standard Cobb-Douglas preference implies that the elasticity of intratemporal
substitution (ES) between durables and non-durables is one, whereas the preference
weight of nondurable goods is equal to α. Moreover, the curvature parameter σ is
equivalent to the relative risk aversion, while the EIS is equal to the inverse of the
relative risk aversion, 1/σ. However, the addition of nonhomotheticity parameter
in this model changes the standard interpretation and elasticities implied by the
Cobb-Douglas utility function.
2.3.4.1 Non-homotheticity Parameter
The non-homotheticity preference introduces an income effect of cars, which would
otherwise be absent in the Cobb-Douglas utility function. The parameter τ measures
how much of a luxury goods a car is in household preference. The higher the τ is, the
less of a necessity cars are for households. The income effect is an important aspect
of the model to fit a relative demand function for durable goods (Pakoš, 2011). A
consumption share of nondurable goods will be relatively large when the value of τ
is large. At sufficiently low income (wealth), households will have zero demand for
durable consumption. At this point, a small change in relative prices of durable goods
will have no impact on non-durable demands, hence zero elasticity of intratemporal
substitution. As household income (wealth) becomes sufficiently high, the ES is larger
and approaches 1.
A low value of τ implies that the outside option of owning a private vehicle provides
low utility flow or that there is not many non-durable goods or services that can
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be used in place of cars. Figure 12 demonstrates the aggregate implications of the
parameter over the average life-cycle consumption and saving. At low value of τ , cars
are more of a necessity and hence households will start purchasing a car very early in
life. This contributes to a relatively low level of assets and non-durable consumption.
The lower the τ , the higher the fraction of car owners in the population. They will
also have higher cumulative durable adjustment and frequency of adjustment over the
life cycle. For instance, if τ is only 50, all the median-income households will own a
car. When the value of τ is high, young households are more likely to not own a car
and become car owners when they are older and accumulate more assets.
Note that the model-generated fraction of the population owning a car is mono-
tonically increasing over the life cycle given any value of τ due to the imposed utility
function and the life-cycle setting. To allow for a more flexible pattern of the fraction
of car owners generated by the model to match data, cohort-specific τ would be
necessary. This is because the data consists of many cohorts, and different cohorts
could have varying degrees of non-homotheticity in their car preferences.
2.3.4.2 Curvature Parameter and EIS
Given a standard constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function, σ is
the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and EIS is equal to 1/σ. However, given
the non-homotheticity in durable good preferences, σ is no longer equivalent to the
coefficient of relative risk aversion, and 1/σ is no longer the EIS. Nonetheless, their
inverse relationship remains. For clarity, the parameter σ is referred to as the curvature
parameter.
Households with high curvature parameters, σ, will prefer having smooth consump-
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tion over their life cycle. Generally, a high value in the curvature parameter works
in two directions: 1) households have precautionary savings to smooth consumption
over time, and 2) households whose EIS is low prefer a flat consumption profile.
Consequently, they may consume more when they are younger in comparison to
households with lower value in the curvature parameter. Households with low value
of the curvature parameter or high EIS may hold off consumption when younger and
consume a large amount later in life.
In the presence of durable goods, households are also likely to smooth out durable
consumption over the life cycle. Therefore, households with high curvature, or low
EIS, will be more likely to buy durable goods when they are younger in order to
smooth out their durable consumption over the lifetime. This in turn will result in
less saving, and lower consumption of both their durable and non-durable goods when
they are older. On the other hand, households with low curvature parameter, or high
EIS, will consume less durable goods when they are young, save more and enjoy a
higher level of durable and non-durable goods when they are older.
At the aggregate level, the curvature parameter influences the trend and level of
fractions of car owners, durable spending, and the frequency of durable adjustment in
the economy over the life cycle. A higher level of the curvature parameter (lower EIS)
will imply higher spending on both durable and non-durable goods at a younger age,
and lower spending at an older age (Figure 13).
One concern is the the specified utility function has an underlying assumption that
households have the same curvature in preferences for durable and non-durable goods.
The functional form is in line with the standard in the literature; however, it imposes
the same curvature on consumption profiles for both goods and generates the trend of
life-cycle nondurable, durable, and assets mentioned above (Figure 13). Future work
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may consider relaxing this assumption to allow for the curvature of non-durable and
durable profiles to vary more independently.
2.4 Empirical strategy
Some parameters are chosen outside the model from data or closely related studies.
The income process parameters are estimated exogenously from the model. Given the
previously chosen and estimated variables, the rest of the parameters are estimated
endogenously within the model using GMM to match moments from data. Parameters
chosen outside the model include r, δ, Fv, Fo, and β. The six parameters estimated
within the model include Fv, Fo, τ, α, σ, and ψ.
2.4.1 Data
To estimate the model parameters, data moments are constructed from the
household-level data, Townsend Thai Data: Urban and Rural Resurvey in 2005
to 2015. Townsend Thai data consists of a very detailed and continuous panel of
household assets, consumption, and income for over 10 years. It is the longest and
most complete panel of Thai household-level data. Moreover, assets and wealth data,
which are the model’s key variables, are of high quality and very detailed. The data
are collected annually and if there is any discrepancy in questionnaire responses
households will be asked to confirm or reconcile the discrepancy. This substantially
reduces measurement errors normally encountered in the survey data.
One drawback is that the Townsend Thai data sample is not representative of
the whole country while it is representative of the urban and rural areas of the six
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provinces it is sampled from. Nonetheless, summary statistics (Table 1) shows that
the Urban and Rural Resurvey of Townsend Thai Data together are approximately
representative of the Socioeconomic Survey (SES) data, which is the primary Thai
household data collected by the National Statistical Office. For instance, the averages
of gross income and the number of vehicles owned by households in SES fall right
between the averages of those in Townsend Urban and Rural Resurvey.
2.4.1.1 Assets
Table 2 shows summary statistics and the composition of household assets. House-
hold assets included as the variable A in the model are comprised of both liquid and
illiquid assets. Liquid assets include saving, checking accounts and cash. Illiquid
assets consists of household fixed assets, vehicles, land, land with housing, agricultural
assets, business assets, lending, and net liability.
As mentioned before, the inclusion of illiquid assets is used to accurately represent
household wealth. The average of liquid asset holdings for households is 27 thousand
THB, which accounts for only 6% of the average household net wealth of 436 thousand
THB (Table 2). Household asset holding would be tremendously misrepresented
without including illiquid wealth. Given that the model period is one year, the
assumption that households can access their illiquid wealth costlessly is reasonable.
However, in a model concerned with shorter responses, such as quarterly responses,
the assumption that these assets can be accessed without friction might be too strong.
A look at the average and median of the composition of household wealth reveals
a large wealth inequality in Thailand. The average of wealth is significantly larger
than the median wealth, and the majority of households do not own land, housing, or
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vehicles. The income disparity, however, is not as large. More than half of households
do not own a car. The average of household vehicle value is 63 thousand THB,
approximately 15% of the average net wealth (Table 2).
The life-cycle asset profile from Townsend data (constructed by substracting out
the year effects) shows a similar hump shape observed in the US data. Wealth
accumulation peaks at around age 50, but older households barely deaccumulate
wealth afterwards (Figure 16).
Fixed Assets and Personal Vehicles
Townsend data reports initial asset value in the first survey, and all the new
purchases of fixed assets in the following resurvey. To construct a household fixed
asset profile, I use depreciation rates specific to types of fixed assets. Household board
durables, including appliances, are assumed to depreciate at rate 16.5 %, agricultural
assets at 13.15%, and business assets at rate 15.79 %. The rates are chosen based on
the depreciation rates used by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis on the most
related board durables in each category. Fixed asset value and household car value
are calculated following the standard law of motion:
dit = (1− δd)dit−1 + Iit
Where dit is the fixed asset or car value in each period and Iit is the new purchase of
the fixed asset at time t.
For the purpose of the car tax rebate policy evaluation, only passenger cars and
pick-up trucks are included in the value of durable consumption, Dit, in the model.
Other types of fixed assets are included in household wealth, Ait. The depreciation
rate for cars is assumed to be 9.4%, from the author’s calculation to fit the aggregate
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capital stock and gross capital investment of personal vehicles in the private sector as
reported by the Capital Stock of Thailand and National Income (NESDB,2017).
Figure 17 shows household car holdings over the life cycle. The profile also shows
a similar hump-shape pattern with a peak at around age 35. Afterwards, households
seem to maintain a flat value of car holding over time. The frequency of car adjustment
over the life cycle is also calculated by using the number of times that households
purchase and/or sell a car over 10 years. It shows a declining trend that younger
households tend to purchase a car more frequently than older households (Figure
19.) This may reflect cohort-specific preferences that cars are more of a necessity for
younger cohorts.
2.4.1.2 Consumption
Household non-durable consumption consists of household spending on food,
alcoholic beverages, tobacco, gasoline (excluding gasoline for business or farm use),
and spending on ceremonies. Household spending on services and semi-durable goods,
namely house repairs, vehicle repairs, education-related expenses, clothing, and food
eaten away from home are also included. Figure 18 shows household non-durable
spending by cohorts from 2005 to 2015. Non-durable consumption also has a hump-
shape profile with a peak at age 50.
2.4.1.3 Income
The labor income is constructed from wages and gross operating surpluses of
households from the Townsend Thai data. For households that are wage earners, the
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labor income is straightforward. However, more than half of the sample are business
owners and farmers. Their earned incomes, i.e. operating surplus, is a mixed income:
a return of both labor and capital. In order to account for labor income for these
households, I account their income based on the capital productivity factor reported
in the Capital Stock of Thailand by the National Accounts Office. I use the capital
product factor for the agricultural sector (labor product factor = 1-capital product
factor) to account for operating surpluses of farms, and the capital product factor for
the service sector for operating surpluses of other businesses. (Note that most small
businesses that households own are in the service sector while most of workers in the
industrial sector are wage earners.) If households have many sources of income I add
all the incomes that are considered labor income plus a fraction of operating surpluses
of their businesses or farms together. Income also has a hump-shape profile over the
life-cycle (Figure 15), with a peak also at age 50 and a steady decline afterwards.
2.4.2 Estimations
Estimations are done in two steps: first some parameters are chosen or estimated
outside the model. Then given the exogenously chosen or estimated parameters, the
rest of parameters are estimated endogenously within the model. Parameters chosen
outside the model include r, δ, Fv, Fo, and β, while the income process parameters
are estimated exogenously. There are five parameters estimated within the model,
including τcohort=1,2, α, σ, and ψ.
Parameters Chosen Outside the Model
The asset return rate, r, is chosen to reflect a middle range value of asset returns
in the data. Assets in the model consist of both liquid assets, in the form of saving
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and cash, and a household’s fixed assets net liability. The average saving rate in
Thailand over the time period was relatively stable, around 2-3 % annually (author’s
calculation from saving interest rates of major commercial banks reported by the Bank
of Thailand). Some households own businesses or farms and business or farm assets
often generate returns at a higher rate than saving. Furthermore, some households
lend money to other households and their reported returns are approximately 12 %
(weighted average by the size of loan). Given the return rates from various sources, I
choose a middle value of asset return rates at 5 %.
The depreciation rate of cars is chosen to be at 9.4 %. The rate is calculated by
the author given the aggregate level of capital for private vehicles and the level of the
gross private personal vehicle investment reported by National Accounts over the past
10 years. The depreciate rate is calculated to match the implicit depreciation rate
over time of the aggregate level of private personal vehicles.
The fixed adjustment cost Fo is set at 8 thousand THB, reflecting expenses in
purchasing a vehicle, including title transfer, and license registration. The proportional
adjustment cost, Fv, is chosen to be 0.10. However, robustness check is made for
assumed values of Fv equal to 0.05 and 0.15.
β is fixed to be at 0.95. This is the value that yields the best fit of moments on
average and lowest residuals of the quadratic of the differences between model and
data moments.
Income Process Parameter Estimation
In order to fit the stochastic parameter for the income process, first the life cycle
component is estimated to fit a 4th order polynomial regression of yearly earnings
on age. The year effect is also estimated as a deterministic part of the income. The
residues from the regression are then use to estimate the stochastic process parameters
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following the estimation process as in Kaplan and Violante (2010). The parameters
are estimated using GMM, by matching the covariance matrix of regression residues
of yearly earning to the covariance matrix generated from the model. The permanent
shocks are estimated to follow the AR1 process with an autocorrelation ρz=0.93, and
a standard deviation of sigmaz = 0.09, while the temporary shocks have a standard
deviation σx = 0.29 (Table 5.)
2.4.3 Identification
To pin down the key parameters of interest, namely the curvature and non-
homothetic parameters, adjustment costs parameters, Fv and Fo, are chosen to fit
outside evidence, and the patience parameter β is fixed at 0.95. This is because
the consumption and asset profiles cannot pin down the adjustment cost, patience,
curvature, and non-homothetic parameters at the same time. For instance, there are
many ways that the model can generate a high rate of consumption of durable goods
early in life: 1) value of Fo is low, 2) τ is low, or 3) σ is high (EIS is low) and households
prefer having durables early in life. Similarly, there are a few ways to generate high
assets at the end of life: 1) having high bequest motive, ψ, 2) high patience, β or 3)
low σ (high EIS) so households save in order to have high consumption later.
Without fixing Fv, Fo and β, the key parameters cannot be pinned down. Despite
the fact that the moments of frequency of adjustment and probability of adjustments
are also included, adjustment cost parameters are difficult to pin down concurrently
with τ because both parameters influence the frequency of adjustment. However, in
future work that are interested in pinning down the dynamic of durable adjustment
more precisely, the frequency and size of adjustment can help pin down these param-
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eters while σ and τ are fixed or estimated exogenously with proper identification.
An indirect inference that focuses on the dynamic of the durable adjustment, e.g.
see Berger et al. (2018), is also another alternative to pin down the adjustment cost
parameters.
The rest of the parameters are estimated using GMM to match model-generated
moments to data moments. Targeted moments include 1) car ownership rates, 2)
frequency of adjustment, 3) probability of adjustment, 4) asset, 5) non-durable
spending and 6) durable spending. Durable spending is chosen over durable stock to
be the matching moments due to the fact that durable stock is a model-generated
value that is contingent on the assumed value of the depreciation rate, δ. Durable
spending, on the other hand, is the value that is taken directly from data and is also
more relevant for the policy evaluation of consumer spending.
Parameters Fo and τ are both influential to a household’s decision of owning a car
over the life cycle. Fo and τ will move together to match the level of durable spending.
To pin down τ , I fixed Fo at 8 as a benchmark. Car ownership rates are another key
moments that pin down τ , while the consumption and asset profiles together pin down
the curvature parameter, σ, and the terminal wealth parameter, ψ.
Moments are targeted at Age× Income× Y ear cells. Parameters are calibrated
to match data in year 2006 to 2011, prior to the car tax rebate introduction. For
robustness, data moments with sample size less than 30 are excluded, while moments
of the probability of adjustment, durable spending and frequency of adjustment with
sample sizes of car owners less than 10 are excluded. To avoid the small sample size
bias, the identity matrix is used as the weight matrix for GMM. Moreover, due to the
calculation of frequency of adjustment, a few periods of model needs to be simulated
for the value of frequency of adjustment to converge. Therefore, only the last three
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periods of the moments of frequency of adjustment from the models are matched with
data.
As mentioned above, the implied monotonically increasing trend in the fraction of
car owners over the life cycle will impose additional restrictions on model-generated
moments. Assuming one value of τ for all cohorts imposes an additional assumption
that populations over different cohorts must have the same taste or preference for
cars. However, the cohort effect is likely present in the data where young households
are more likely to own a car due to their lifestyle than older households, despite
having relatively low wealth or income. To capture the cohort effects, I allow the
non-homotheticity parameters to vary by cohort: τ1 for the young and middle-age
cohorts, and τ2 for the old cohort.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Model Fit
Estimation results are reported in Table 5. As expected the non-homotheticity
parameters are lower for younger cohorts than the old cohorts, in line with the fact that
car usages are more prevalent among the younger households. The parameter α, which
is the share of nondurable consumption in a standard Cobb-Douglas utility function,
is equal to 0.26. The value is smaller than the share of nondurable consumption in
the data due to the non-homotheticity specification. The parameter α moves with the
parameter τ to scale the size of non-durable consumption to the non-homotheticity
parameter. The curvature parameter σ is estimated to be 0.95 and is robust to various
specifications of Fv (Table 6.)
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Figures 21 and 22 compare model-generated moments to data moments. Both
the asset level and car ownership rates are matched fairly well throughout the life
cycle for all levels of income (Figure 21) after allowing for the inclusion of the
terminal value parameter and cohort-specific non-homotheticiy parameters. The
model-generated moments of durable spending and non-durable spending also fit data
moments reasonably. The level of durable spending on average is in line with data but
the timing of durable spending is not exact. The probability of adjustment is matched
well for most groups except for the young cohorts for whom the model underestimates
their probability to adjust.
The model underpredicts durable spending and probability of durable adjustment
among the young cohort, especially the low income group. Allowing for an additional
young-cohort specific τ may improve the fit.
2.5.2 Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution
In a standard Cobb-Douglas utility function, EIS is equivalent to 1/σ. The
estimated σ given other parameters is around 0.95, which would yield EIS of 1.05 with
the absence of non-homotheticity parameters. Closely-related studies (Berger et al.,
2018; Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger, 2011) assume a middle range of commonly
used value of σ to be 2, which implies a moderate size of EIS at 0.5. However, in a
recent notable study Kaplan and Violante (2014) has chosen EIS (not estimated) value
of 2 and argued that high EIS is consistent with theoretical and empirical evidence in
recent promising approaches in the asset pricing literature (Bansal et al., 2012; Barro,
2009), and GMM-based methods that have estimate EIS well above 1 (Hansen et al.,
2007).
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Due to the income effects generated by the non-homothetic preferences, the ES
and EIS for households are different at varying level of income and wealth. At a low
level of wealth or income, durables are a luxury and can be perfectly substituted
by nondurables. Households must already be consuming a sufficiently high level of
nondurables in order to start consuming durables. Then ES also influences the size of
household EIS.
Besides the varying ES, adjustment costs in durables and liquidity constraints also
create additional frictions in a household’s durable adjustment. Frictions should not
interfere with household long-run consumption; however, these frictions are important
for shorter run responses within a few years of price changes.
EIS calculated from simulations is well above 1. Due to the rich features of the
model, the closed-form solution of EIS is not possible (Attanasio and Weber, 2010).
To illustrate heterogeneity in EIS generated from the model, I conduct simulations
of optimal consumption paths implied by the model when expected and unexpected
changes in the real interest rate are introduced. The simulation is initialized with the
same initial distribution explained in the Policy Experiments Section. Figure 25 shows
an average consumption and saving path from the simulations when a permanent
change of 0.5% increase in real interest rate is introduced. The paths compare the
average consumption and saving paths when there is no rate change to the paths with
expected and unexpected rate changes.
Households respond to the rate change differently depending on whether the rate
change anticipated or unanticipated. When the rate change is anticipated, households
lower both non-durable and durable consumption many periods before the actual rate
change in order to accumulate assets in preparation for the rate change. After the rate
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change occurred, household increase durable spending while non-durable consumption
remained lower than the baseline.
When the rate change is unanticipated households are predicted to reduce non-
durable consumption and increase saving immediately after the change takes place.
However, the effect on durable spending is delayed. The simulation shows no change
in durable spending in the first year of the unexpected rate change possibly due to
the frictions from adjustment costs and liquidity constraints. However, the drop in
durable spending is prominent one year following the unexpected rate change and is
predicted to resume to a level higher than the baseline afterwards due to the rise in
wealth from the rate hike (Figure 25.)
To illustrate the heterogeneity in EIS for varying ages and income levels, the
change in consumption following the change in real interest rate is shown in Table 10.
The simulation result suggests that low-income and younger households have higher
EIS than high income and old households. They have the highest drop in consumption
change after the rate increase. This is contributed to by the fact that the low-income
households are closer to the liquidity constraints and that young households have
stronger precautionary saving motives. Young households are also the group with the
highest decline in durable spending in one year following the rate change.
On the other hand, old households in the top quintiles (3rd and 4th), as well as
young and middle-age households in the 5th quintile of are found to have positive EIS,
that is they increase non-durable spending when interest rate increases. This is likely
because the wealth effect from the rate increase is stronger than marginal utility of
additional saving. In other words, at the high level of wealth, marginal utility in the
value function from additional saving is smaller than the gain from marginal utility
from current consumption. Simulation results also suggest that overall EIS can be
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more negative in the second year after the unexpected change, due to the frictions
from adjustment costs and liquidity constraints (Table 10).
2.6 Policy Experiments
This section presents results of three policy experiments: consumption tax break,
durable tax break, and income tax break. First, a policy experiment to mimic
Thailand’s car tax rebate policy is conducted to evaluate the model prediction power.
The simulation is conducted based on model parameters estimated targeting household
consumption only prior to the car tax policy. Then this section proceeds with
alternative policy experiments, namely a tax break on non-durable goods and income.
The economy is simulated from initial values of the household data in 2005. The
simulated economy consists of 100,000 individuals with initial values of income, assets,
and personal vehicle holdings in 2005 from Townsend Thai data. The initial values
are initialized for households age 26, 46 and 66 to represent the young (26 to 45),
middle age (46 to 65), and old (66 to 85) cohorts respectively (Table 7.) Initial values
of assets and incomes are drawn from the 10th, 30th, 50th, 70th and 90th percentiles
in the data. The number of households are weighted according to the Thai population
distribution in 2005 reported by Official Statistics Registration Systems, with 52%,
36% and 11% in the young, middle-age and old cohorts respectively.
All the tax breaks in the simulations are introduced at t = 7, or equivalent
to year 2011. The age-dependent deterministic components are the same as those
estimated from Townsend Thai data. However, to simulate the aggregate economy
more closely, the income year effect is according to the trend of aggregate Compensation
of Employees: the aggregated pure labor income reported in National Income (NESDB,
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2017). For simplicity I assume a uniform tax rates of 25%, 7%, and 5% for durable
goods, non-durable goods, and income respectively across the economy.
2.6.1 The Car Tax Rebate Policy Simulation
The car tax rebate policy is a temporary and favorable shock in the prices of
durables. To implement the policy experiment in the simulation, the tax break is
introduced unexpectedly and temporarily for two years. The simulation also mimics
the policy regulation by imposing an additional proportional fixed cost of 20% of the
purchasing price for five years after purchasing if household purchased a car during
the policy.
Furthermore, to mimic the policy that tax rebates are only eligible for new car
purchases, I imposed a rule to partially limit household purchases that benefit from
the tax break for purchases with a minimum value of 500 thousand THB during the
policy. This works well in mimicking the policy since only new car purchases benefit
from the tax break. The limitations of this policy experiment and the model is that it
does not capture the general equilibrium effect on car prices as a result of the policy.
As discussed in Chapter 1, used car prices plummeted by 20% immediately after the
policy had ended and prices of new cars also started to decline a few years after the
policy had ended. The result of this policy experiment should be interpreted as a
pure partial equilibrium effect that the prices of cars are unaffected by the tax break.
The model is initialized in 2005. Between year 2005 and 2009, Thai income notably
rose and the model predicted durable spending to increase dramatically (Figure 26),
consistent with the observed distribution in 2009 in Townsend data (Table 8). The
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tax break is imposed unexpectedly in 2011 and 2012, and the car tax is resumed
afterwards.
The model predicts durable spending to increase by a total of approximately 150%
during policy. The result is consistent with the surge of new car sales during the
policy shown in Chapter 1. However, the comparison of model durable spending with
new car sales and national account data should be made with caution. New car sales
and national account data only take into account household spending on new car
purchases but not spending in the secondary market. However, the model durable
spending includes both spending on new and used cars. The simulation result also
suggests that the policy does not seem to cannibalize future household spending on
cars by much, only 6% lower than the baseline after the policy. Yet this results do not
contradict with the empirical evidence of cannibalization of future car sales presented
in chapter 1, since the model abstract from the general equilibrium effect and the
model durable spending also include spending on used cars.
The simulated data shows that most likely households to purchase a car during
the policy experiment are those that already own a car with a high level of assets
who make a large purchase during the policy. Some households with medium-level
income and wealth also make a car purchase during the policy but they account
for a smaller portion. Lower income and poor households do not make a purchase
during the policy. This is expected due to the non-homothetic preference that most
households purchasing cars during the policy are those with higher assets or income.
As expected, the policy has unintended effects on dampening nondurable consump-
tion. The simulation predicts a sizable reduction in nondurable consumption during
the policy of 5% in the first year, and approximately 1.5% lower in the following two
years, and 0.8% and 0.2% lower in the fourth and fifth year (Table 11). However,
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larger and long lasting impacts are on the decline in household assets. The simulation
suggests as much as 7-8% decline in asset accumulation even after 2-3 years following
the policy. The model assets include household fixed assets as well as household
business and farm assets. The results strongly suggest that this could have a larger
negative impact on the economy by dampening household investment and essentially
cannibalizing the production growth and demand in other sectors. A general equilib-
rium model would be more apt to answer that question, however, the lower level of
assets would also likely lead to lower investment and wealth in the general equilibrium
model.
In conclusion, the model predicts that the car tax break contributes to additional
car purchases of approximately 60-80% annually. The adverse effects on nondurable
spending and asset levels are sizable. Future asset levels are predicted to be as much
as 8% lower in at least the two years after the policy has ended. The sizable impact is
contributed by to the presence of large ES among wealthy and high-income households
and large EIS.
2.6.2 Alternative Policy Experiments
Similar policy experiments are conducted for non-durable tax break and income
tax break. The tax breaks are introduced unexpectedly and lasted for 2 years.
Figure 27 shows the aggregate responses to the non-durable consumption tax break.
The unexpected and temporary tax break of consumption tax of 7% is predicted to
lead to approximately 8% increase in non-durable consumption during the policy, and
a small increase of approximately 1% in the following 3 years after the tax break
ended (Table 11.) Asset levels are predicted to increase as much as 8-9% during the
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policy and remained about 5-7% higher in the following 3 years after the tax break
ended. There is a slight negative impact on durable spending, approximately 1% lower
during and 2 years after the policy. However, durable spending with the consumption
tax break is predicted to outgrow durable spending without the tax break in the third
year following the policy.
Another policy experiment is the income tax break for two years (Figure 28.) The
effective tax rate is assumed to be 5%. Given the progressive tax rates, in reality
only those that earn more than 200 thousand THB would have to pay income tax in
Thailand. Given the income distribution, roughly only the top one quintile would
have to pay income tax. Therefore, the assumption of 5% income tax rate is quite
large for most people. The income tax break is predicted to increase both non-durable
and durable spending by 2-4% during the tax break and the increase in consumption
persists in the following years. Meanwhile, the assets are predicted to be as much as
10% higher (Table 11.) The surge in assets after the income tax break suggests that
low income, low-asset households are likely to spend the additional income from the
tax break on improving their asset balance sheets.
2.7 Conclusions
This study investigates the role of durable goods with adjustment costs in household
consumption and saving decisions . Estimations shows a striking quantitative result
that Thai households have high EIS and hence have large responses to the car tax
rebate program. Due to large EIS, the stimulus has a large impact on shifting household
future durable demand forward and significantly lower household future nondurable
consumption and assets. Alternative policy experiments show that alternative form of
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tax break, such as consumption or income tax break will have a much more favorable
impact on future consumption and saving.
This study also contributes to a few strands of literature, in particular, it quantita-
tively demonstrates the implication of non-homotheticiy preference of durable goods
and transaction costs on EIS. Estimated EIS for Thai households is large and well
above 1. Furthermore, contrary to previous empirical findings that wealthy households
have higher EIS, the simulation results show that low asset and low income households
could have large responses to a change in the rate of asset returns as well.
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2.8 Tables
Year/Data set SES Townsend Urban Townsend Rural
Variables 2009 2010 2010
Male 0.67 0.56 0.64
(0.47) (0.50) (0.48)
Age 51.7 54.87 55.99
(14.65) (11.39) (12.40)
College 0.11 0.17 0.04
(0.32) (0.38) (0.19)
Gross Income (THB) 250,832 286,993 194,827
(427,440) (323,263) (247,116)
Number of household members NA 4.08 3.89
(1.91) (1.78)
Saving NA 45,031 36,362
(280,436) (154,095)
Number of passenger cars owned 0.12 0.17 0.06
(0.39) (0.43) (0.26)
Number of pick-up trucks owned 0.25 0.25 0.24
(0.51) (0.48) (0.48)
Number of cars and pick-up trucks owned 0.37 0.42 0.30
(0.65) (0.64) (0.57)
Standard errors in parenthesis
*Weighted average and standard errors adjusted so that the SES is representative to the kingdom
Source: SES and Townsend Thai Data Annual Resurvey
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Thai Household Demographics in 2009-2010
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Mean Mean Median Median
(2002THB) Fraction of wealth (2002THB) Fraction of wealth
Income 163,153 0.37 100,640 0.92
Net wealth 436,012 109,195
Net Liquid asset 27,322 0.06 3,660 0.03
Illiquid assets net liability 408,690 0.94 95,952 0.88
Household fixed asset 112,200 0.26 27,905 0.26
Vehicles 63,650 0.15 0 0.00
Land 400,974 0.92 0 0.00
Land with housing 42,990 0.10 0 0.00
Agricultural assets 11,096 0.03 0 0.00
Business assets 15,824 0.04 0 0.00
Borrowing 134,499 0.31 39,524 0.36
Lending 3,095 0.00 0 0.01
Source: Townsend Thai Data Annual Resurvey, 2005
Table 2: Thai Household Asset Portfolio Composition in 2005
Young Middle Age Old
(25-40) (41-60) 61+
Low Income 0.13 0.16 0.10
(1-3rd quintiles) (67) (475) (435)
High Income 0.44 0.49 0.53
(4-5th quintiles) (67) (475) (435)
Number of observations in parenthesis
Source: Townsend Thai Data Annual Resurvey, 2010
Table 3: Thailand’s Car Ownership Rates in 2010 by Cohort and Income
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Young Middle Age Old
(25-40) (41-60) 61+
Low Income 241 324 301
(1-3rd quintiles) (67) (475) (435)
High Income 410 530 738
(4-5th quintiles) (41) (405) (196)
Number of observations in parenthesis
Value in real term unit in year 2002 thousand THB
Source: Townsend Thai Data Annual Resurvey, 2010
Table 4: Thailand’s Household Assets in 2010 by Cohort and Income
Chosen to match external evidence:
r 0.05
δ 0.094
Fv 0.10
Fo 8
β 0.95
Income Process Parameters: Estimated exogenously
ρz 0.9316
σz 0.0959
σx 0.2962
Estimated to match targeted moments
τ1 589.76
τ2 652.32
α 0.2654
σ 0.9453
ψ 2.3402
Table 5: Parameter Values
Assumed Fv τ1 τ2 α σ ψ
0.05 383.62 386.29 0.3673 0.9592 3.9421
0.10 589.75 652.32 0.2654 0.9453 2.3402
0.15 538.01 558.88 0.2763 0.9559 3.0323
Table 6: Robustness Check: Parameter Estimates with Varying Fv
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Percentile Young Middle Age Old
Income
10th 20.3742 21.2512 12.5640
30th 45.9021 49.9741 34.8406
50th 79.9840 82.0556 60.3843
70th 117.2353 135.2242 113.9034
90th 216.1224 252.5160 239.1180
Asset
10th -83.2559 -100.6770 -57.9023
30th -25.3541 -31.0156 -4.9154
50th -5.5769 -1.7940 23.0558
70th 27.6121 65.4760 151.1958
90th 410.2276 475.8174 798.6896
Personal Vehicles
10th 0 0 0
30th 0 0 0
50th 0 0 0
70th 0 0 0
90th 197.6870 256.1757 198.6870
Value in real term in year 2002 thousand THB
Source: Townsend Thai Data Annual Resurvey, 2005
Table 7: Distribution of Thai Household Income and Assets in 2005
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Percentile Young Middle Age Old
Income
25th percentile 58.99 57.13 34.32
50th percentile 97.87 104.88 64.72
75th percentile 149.70 183.74 130.54
95th percentile 309.36 374.20 321.29
Asset
25th percentile 6.61 16.89 21.82
50th percentile 123.96 185.56 142.61
75th percentile 426.49 508.06 479.03
95th percentile 1226.08 1368.98 1616.31
Personal Vehicles
25th percentile 0 0 0
50th percentile 0 0 0
75th percentile 56.55 71.71 0
95th percentile 313.69 379.56 299.60
Value in real term in year 2002 thousand THB
Source: Townsend Thai Data Annual Resurvey, 2009
Table 8: Distribution of Thai Household Income and Assets in 2009
Years after the rate change Unexpected No change (1)-(2) EIS
change (1) (2)
t=0
Nondurable+Durable -0.069 -0.0319 -0.038 -3.98
Nondurable 0.0142 0.035 -0.0231 -3.98
Durable -0.167 -0.1677 0 0
t=1
Non-durable+Durable -0.318 -0.096 -0.222 -46.71
Non-durable 0.0521 0.0687 -0.0166 -3.489
Durable -0.507 -1.762 -1.594 -264.04
Consumption growth rate is calculated from lnCit/Cit−1
Aggregate EIS is calculated from ln(
∑
Cr=0.055it∑
Cr=0.05it
)/ ln(1+0.055
1+0.05
)
Note that changes in durable shown here only reflect durable spending only. If household
adjust their durable stock downward, this is not reflected in the EIS of durable calculated.
Table 9: Aggregate consumption growth given an unexpected and permanent change
of 0.5% in real interest rate.
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Income quintile 1 2 3 4 5
Years after the rate change
t=0 Non-durable consumption
Young -15.3838 -10.7006 -7.4673 -3.9251 0.0755
Middle Age -9.6155 -7.5859 -4.4405 -4.4971 2.8819
Old -2.1101 -2.0258 1.4505 3.7915 -2.1139
t=1
Non-durable consumption
Young -11.9989 -9.7911 -6.3606 -2.4030 -1.3866
Middle Age -8.5881 -6.7969 -3.2335 -1.7099 0.6227
Old -1.1840 -1.0907 1.0421 4.3409 -0.7523
Durable spending
Young NA NA -332.5354 -246.0743 -388.0935
Middle Age NA -90.4792 -179.2275 -177.5845 -222.9534
Old NA NA -163.0574 -88.2789 -61.3172
Non-durable + Durable spending
Young -23.4761 -19.2970 -29.5814 -50.7130 -104.6438
Middle Age -19.3670 -13.6164 -36.6854 -14.9088 -70.4760
Old -2.8300 -1.3115 1.6549 -21.9404 -1.4356
EIS is calculated from ln(
∑
Cr=0.055it∑
Cr=0.05it
)/ ln(1+0.055
1+0.05
)
Table 10: Heterogeneity in Consumption Responses from a Simulation Given Unex-
pected Real Interest Rate Change of 0.5%
Years after the policy introduction 0 1 2 3 4
Car Tax Break
Non-durable spending -0.0573 -0.0135 -0.0149 -0.0076 -0.0019
Durable spending 0.5794 0.8817 0.2308 -0.0646 -0.0592
Assets 0.0329 -0.0691 -0.0786 -0.0767 -0.0747
Nondurable Consumption Tax Break
Non-durable spending 0.0853 0.0821 0.0118 0.0099 0.0088
Durable spending 0.0140 -0.0139 -0.0115 -0.0033 0.0205
Assets 0.0869 0.0788 0.0699 0.0622 0.0557
Income Tax Break
Non-durable spending 0.0228 0.0207 0.0179 0.0151 0.0135
Durable spending 0.0385 0.0232 -0.0082 0.0575 0.0281
Assets 0.1007 0.1044 0.0920 0.0801 0.0712
Changes reported are calculated from ln(
∑
X taxbreakit /
∑
Xnotaxbreakit )
Table 11: Policy Experiments: Comparison of Aggregated Optimal Consumption and
Assets
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2.9 Figures
Figure 9: Policy Function of Durable Holding Given A and D
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Figure 10: A Level Set of Policy Function at Different Level of Assets Given t = 30
and z = 0
Figure 11: A Level Set of Policy Function at Different Ages Given A = 200 and z = 0
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Figure 12: Comparative Statics for τ : Average Life-Cycle Consumption, Assets, and
Durable Adjustment
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Figure 13: Comparative Statics for σ: Average Life-Cycle Consumption, Assets, and
Durable Adjustment
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Figure 14: Average Life-Cycle Path Way of Median-Income Households
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Figure 15: Life-cycle Average Income by Cohort from Townsend Thai Data in 2005-
2014
Figure 16: Life-cycle Average Assets by Cohort from Townsend Thai Data in 2005-2014
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Figure 17: Life-cycle Average Personal Vehicle Holdings by Cohort from Townsend
Thai Data in 2005-2014
Figure 18: Life-cycle Average Non-durable Consumption by Cohort from Townsend
Thai Data in 2005-2014 (Monthly Value)
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Figure 19: Life-cycle Average Probability of Adjustment by Age from Townsend Thai
Data in 2005-2014
Figure 20: Average Non-durable Spending by Policy Participation From Townsend
Thai Data in 2005 to 2014
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Figure 21: Targeted Moments: Assets and Fractions of Car Owners
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Figure 22: Targeted Moments: Durable and Non-durable Spending
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Figure 23: Targeted Moments: Frequency of Adjustment and Probability of Adjust-
ment
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Figure 24: Non-targeted moments: Durable Stocks and Durable Spending to Income
Ratio
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Figure 25: Policy Experiment with a Change in Asset Returns from 5% to 5.5%
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Figure 26: Policy Experiments: Car Tax Break in 2011-2012
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Figure 27: Policy experiment: Non-durable Consumption Tax Break in 2011-2012
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Figure 28: Policy Experiment: Income Tax Break in 2011-2012
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Chapter 3
THE EUROPEAN SMOKING BANS AND MATURE SMOKERS: CAN THEY
KICK THE HABIT?
Using individual level data, this study investigates whether nationwide smoke-free
legislations in Europe lead to smoking reduction and cessation among mature smokers
in the short run and long run. It exploits cross-country data and multinational
governance of the European Union that provides a quasi-experimental setting for
this study. Top-down regulations on smoke-free environment by the EU mitigate the
self-selection bias and endogeneity bias of smoke-free laws generally faced in other
settings. The results show that light smokers and chain smokers are more likely to
quit smoking after comprehensive bans are in place while there is no significant effect
on average smokers. Mature smokers who work at places with more comprehensive
smoking bans and spend longer hours at work are more likely to quit subsequent to
workplace bans. Moreover, smoking prevalence declines at higher rate among those
working in transportation and health industries where smoking bans are enforced
more strictly. The results confirm that smoking bans, particularly when enforced
more strictly and comprehensively, can increase smoking cessation even among mature
smokers with well-established addiction.
3.1 Introduction
Smoking-free environment legislation in the past decades are campaigned and
enforced to minimize the externality of tobacco smoking. The main goal of smoke-free
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legislations is to reduce exposure to secondhand smoke for nonsmokers. This study asks,
however, whether smoking bans in shared spaces also have added effects on smokers.
In particular, whether smoking bans lead to smoking cessation or reduction. Utilizing
individual level cross-country population data in Europe, this paper examines the
impact of nationwide smoke-free legislations on smoking behaviors of mature smokers.
The research design exploits the fact that European Union (EU) is multinational
governance with top-down regulation on smoke-free environment laws.
The evidence of reduction in secondhand smoke exposure after a smoke-free legisla-
tion is clear with the decline in reported incidences of related health symptoms caused
by secondhand smoke (Eurobarometer, 2012). However, the effect of smoking bans on
smoking reduction or smoking cessation is debatable. While some studies did not find
evidences supporting the causal effects of smoking bans on the reduction of smoking
prevalence (Adda and Cornaglia, 2010; Fichtenberg and Glantz, 2002; Levy and Friend,
2003); others found that smoking bans effectively reduce cigarette consumption and
comprehensive public clean air laws were shown to reduce consumption rates of the
entire population by about 10 percent (Levy and Friend, 2003). Smoking bans could
potentially reduce cigarette consumption through a few different mechanisms: 1)
making it costly to smoke in certain spaces, 2) removing prior smoking cues that
trigger smokers to light up, and 3) shifting public and smokers’ attitudes and beliefs
towards smoking and secondhand smoke that lead to changes in smoking behavior.
First, viewing smoking as a standard consumption behavior with space-time consump-
tion bundle, clean-air laws impose constraints on spaces that smoking can take place,
making smoking in spaces with smoking bans become costly. Smokers who chose to
violate smoking bans may face legal consequences such as fines or social punishment
in the form of negative treatment from others observing their behavior. Smokers may
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reduce their consumption entirely after the bans; alas, they could also substitute away
from smoking in spaces with bans to private spaces, such as home or cars, and not
necessarily reduce their total tobacco consumption. Whether smoking bans leads to
smoking displacement is open to question. Adda and Cornaglia (2010) showed that
bans in public places was shown to lead to higher rates of smoking in private spaces;
while Mons et al. (2012) showed evidences that that smoke-free legislations did not
induce smokers to smoke more in their own home. The contradictory results suggest
that smoking in different spaces is not complete substitution and substitutability
varies among smokers.
In the framework of addiction consumption, smoking decision can be thought of as
“cued-triggered decision process” (Bernheim and Rangel, 2004). Under the premises
of Bernheim and Rangel, uses among addicts are mistake and users are sensitized
to environmental cues that trigger mistaken usages. The urge to smoke is triggered
when they are faced with smoking cues, for instance, urges to smoke is triggered when
they are in the presence of smoking coworkers, or engaging in repetitive jobs that
they habitually smoke while doing. An introduction of smoking bans imposed a shock
that makes smoking in the presence of existing cues suddenly become impossible or
costly. Over time, smokers become less sensitized to those cues and reduce their
consumption, perhaps permanently, or quit entirely in the long run. In contrary, their
consumption could also resume after a period of time if new smoking habits outside of
banned spaces are developed. In the light of cued triggered decision process, smoking
bans facilitate getting rid of existing smoking cues, yet smoking displacement is also
possible.
The shift in attitudes towards secondhand smoke and towards the act of smoking
itself could also lead to reduction in smoking. Public smoking bans could alter social
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norms and induce voluntary bans at home to become more prevalent, as evidences
shown in Italy after their public comprehensive bans in 2006 (Origo and Lucifora,
2013). Moreover, smoking bans in public, especially nationwide bans, could make
smokers feel stigmatized Ritchie et al. (2010) and face with more social pressure to
smoke less or quit. Moreover, smokers may reduce tobacco consumption due to peer
effects. Cutler and Glaeser (2007) showed that among smoker partners, if one of
them is imposed a smoking ban at workplaces; both partners are less likely to smoke
subsequent to the ban.
Without a conclusive answer from theoretical models, many empirical studies
attempt to examine whether smoking bans lead to smoking reduction. However,
quasi-experimental studies trying to identify the impact of smoking bans on smoking
behavior inevitably face with the question of causality: whether smoking bans, indeed,
lead to the reduction in smoking prevalence or vice versa. Workplaces with a high ratio
of nonsmokers or health-conscious employees may be more likely to introduce smoking
bans which in turn may lead to voluntary attrition of smokers out of the workplace
and matriculation of nonsmokers into the workplace. Selective and voluntary smoking
bans at workplaces or certain public spaces like restaurants will allow for sorting
mechanism where smokers will sort themselves to places that allow smoking. Most
studies, with a few exceptions, did not account for the possible potential biases. Evans
et al. (1999) addressed the biases by using simultaneous equations with the size of
establishment as an instrument variable for workplace smoking policy—given that
larger establishments are more likely to impose smoking bans, but not more likely to
attract healthy workers.
The sorting mechanism is less likely when the law is passed at higher levels
with escalated transaction costs to avoid the bans. While smokers could switch
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jobs in the same city if voluntary workplace bans are imposed at the firm level, it
is costly for smokers to switch workplaces across cities or states to avoid city- or
state-level bans. Nonetheless, endogeneity bias could still exist for local ordinances,
state-level or national-level laws. The only study found to address the question
of causality of smoking bans on smoking behavior with national level smoke-free
laws is Chaloupka and Saffer (1992). Using state-year time series data to measure
changes in cigarette demand as a result of state’s regulations, they used simultaneous
equations and confirmed that states with low smoking rates are more likely to pass
workplace-smoking bans.
This paper investigates the effect of smoking bans in a quasi-experimental setting
by exploiting the political structure of the EU. The European Commission’s limited yet
overarching authority over its members brought about acceleration in the process of
national-level smoke-free legislations across Europe in the 2000’s. The Commission had
drawn a deadline in 2009 for all the members to impose smoking bans, and smoke-free
legislations in all the member countries were in place by 2010. The timing of nationwide
smoking bans in each country largely depends on their idiosyncratic legislation process
as well as public attitudes towards the harm of secondhand smoke. Its traditional
public health stance and its relation with the tobacco industry also played a major role.
Moreover, due to the fact that smoking legislations in consideration are nationwide,
mandatory, and top-down, as opposed to voluntary and bottom-up, self-selection
biases encountered in most studies when smoking bans were voluntary, or endogeneity
biases existed at local-level laws are mitigated in this setting.
In the quasi-experimental framework, the Council’s recommendation is condi-
tionally exogenous to smoking prevalence and smoking behavior of residents in each
member country. Different timing in legislations among countries allows for a quasi-
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experiment to test the effect of smoking bans on changes in tobacco consumption. The
effects of nationwide smoking bans on smoking behavior are measured by comparing
the smoking outcomes of individual respondents in countries that imposed smoking
bans earlier to those that imposed smoking bans later. This comparison isolates the
effect of changes in smoking outcomes due to nationwide smoking ban intervention
from changes as a result of overall trends or country-specific trends.
This paper provides new evidences on recently enacted smoking bans that are
stricter and more widespread than those implemented in the past. Most papers
studying clean air laws enacted at the state level in the United States were put
into effect before 1994 when strict laws were unlikely had been implemented at the
time (Levy et al., 2004). Moreover, other quasi-experiment studies on smoking laws
examined laws at local level (Moskowitz et al., 2000; Stephens et al., 1997; Carpenter,
2009), rather than at national level. Carpenter (2009) utilizes similar research design,
exploiting differential timing of adoption of local smoking laws in different counties
in Canada, using a DID estimators. The results show that local laws are effective at
increasing smoking bans at workplaces, as well as reducing smoking and exposure to
tobacco smoke, particularly for blue collars, but less so for white collars and service
workers.
For workplace smoking bans, reviews on population-based worksite studies found
between a 7 and 15 percent reduction in cigarettes smoked (Woodruff and Pierce, 1993;
Glasgow et al., 1997; Evans et al., 1999; Farkas et al., 1999). However, these previous
studies were also done when smoke free legislations were not yet widespread nor strictly
enforced. Furthermore, most of them were firm-specific studies, or population-based
private worksites bans (Levy and Friend, 2003) which could subject to self-selection
and endogeneity biases mentioned above.
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Another important distinction is that this paper focuses on older population.
Most smokers included are mature smokers who have been smoking many years and
have well-established addictions. Well-established smokers are less likely to change
their consumption habits unless there are shocks, such as a newly diagnosed health
conditions (Smith et al., 2001) or external changes, such as smoking restrictions or
price changes. Mature smokers who have smoked for many years are well informed
about the costs, or risks, and benefits of smoking Khwaja et al. (2009). In fact,
they are less responsive to health publicity campaigns about the harms of smoking
(Townsend et. al, 1994) and price changes (Evans and Farrelly, 1998). Smoking bans,
therefore, could be one of the more effective measures to influence mature smokers
and the changes in their smoking behavior are more robust to price or messages.
Furthermore, given their well-established addictions, mature smokers have harder
time to quit in spite of having expressed the desire to quit. Public smoking bans
could break the habit of mature smokers by imposing constraints on spaces they can
smoking, as well as induced changes in norms and public attitudes about acceptable
smoking behavior.
Another advantage this study has is the availability of individual level data that
allows identification of the exposure to smoking bans of respondents with different
demographic information. For instance, employment data on the employment status,
industries of employment, and the number of hours worked each week reveals how
much a respondent is affected by smoking bans at workplaces and whether being more
affected or having smoking bans imposed upon more comprehensively and strictly
lead to higher smoking reduction.
Analyses show that smoking bans lead to smoking reduction and cessation among
mature smokers. Especially, the results do not show a reversion in the likelihood in
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smoking cessation in the long run, indicating that changes in smoking behavior after
smoking bans persist. When classified by the level of smoking intensity at the baseline
interview, it reveals that smoking bans are effective at increasing smoking cessation
among light smokers and very heavy smokers, while the effect on average smokers are
not statistically different from zero. The short-run and long-run effects are similar.
There is heterogeneity in the effect of smoking bans. Those working in places with
more comprehensive bans and/or spending longer time at work are more likely to
quit smoking after workplace bans are implemented. There is an increasing return
in the effects of bans on the hours spent at work and the return starts to diminish
if work hours are more than 60 hours per week. This suggests that smoking cues
have been effectively removed when bans are in place and smokers who quit did not
displace their smoking into other spaces or their own home. Nonetheless, less can be
said about average smokers who did not quit whether they have substituted smoking
in banned spaces with other places.
3.2 Empirical Approach
3.2.1 Background: The EU’s tobacco control and smoke-free legislation
The Council put forth Recommendation (2003/54/C) calling for protection against
exposure to tobacco smoke in public spaces, including indoor workplaces, public
transport, and indoor public places. In the same year, the EU also adopted the World
Health Organization’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) whose
Article 8 targets protection against tobacco smoke. With this in motion, according to
the EU’s report in 2009, all the EU members had national-level smoke-free legislation
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in place to protect people against tobacco smoke exposure in indoor workplaces, public
places, public transport and other public places. While the comprehensiveness and
enforcement of bans may vary among countries, all the EU members follow the health
protection guidelines by the Recommendation and the FCTC.
The European Council struggled with tobacco control front over a decade before
they finally met with a partial success in 2003: putting forth the Recommendation
and adopting the FCTC. The success was largely contributed by international shifts in
attitudes towards the harm of secondhand smoke, and the ascendency of left-leaning
leaders in the EU’s key countries (Duina and Kurzer, 2004). Between 1988 and 2003,
the European Commission struggled with expanding its authority over its members
as they run into a “classic intergovernmental traps” where member countries take
stances according to their traditional public health policies and their relationship with
the tobacco industry (Duina and Kurzer, 2004). Italy and France were unwavering
supporters for the smoke-free legislation as they had established traditions of state
intervention in the realm of health policies and lifestyle choices (Studlar, 2006). On
the other hand, Germany, the Netherlands, and Denmark tended to oppose smoke-free
legislation and resorted to other tobacco-control strategies due to their more libertarian
views with “the ideals of self-governing individuals and consumer freedom” (Duina and
Kurzer, 2004). Under the guideline by the European Commission and the adoption of
FCTC, the speed of legislating process in each country is contingent on the political
and cultural backgrounds, medical communities, and the level of activism against
secondhand smoke.
All the countries have introduced punishment for non-compliance and reported
actual enforcement after smoking bans are imposed (European Commission, 2013).
The most common sanction is fines while the severity varies. Fines for individuals are
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generally lower than fines imposed on enterprises. Smoking bans are also reported
to be the most comprehensive in educational establishments, facilities providing
services for children, public transports, and in the healthcare sector. Meanwhile,
smoke-free legislation imposed on the hospitality sector is the hardest to pass and the
most controversial. Moreover, complicated legislation with exemptions is harder to
implement and enforce, and hence less effective.
3.2.2 Research Design
This paper uses individual data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement
in Europe (SHARE), which includes the total of eleven initial countries in Western
and Southern Europe. SHARE conducted interviews on nationally representative
samples of people age 50 or older and their partners. The survey started in 2004 and
is repeated every two years unless the participants dropped out or became deceased.
The average age of SHARE respondents is 60 as of year 2004; 44 percent of which
is male, 20 percent graduated college, and 48 percent is living with a partner (Table
2.2). New respondents are added in each wave as needed to keep data representative.
SHARE’s initial eleven countries include the Netherlands, Austria, Italy, Sweden,
Spain, Belgium, France, Denmark, Germany, Switzerland and Greece. All of these
countries are the members of the EU except for Switzerland which was excluded from
the sample.
Exploiting the variation in the timing of smoke-free legislation among SHARE
countries, the effect of smoking bans can be identified. After the ratification of FCTC
and the Recommendation, all the member countries introduced a comprehensive
smoking ban within a window of six years, between 2004 and 2010. Table 2.1
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shows the timing of public smoking bans and SHARE interviews. Among the eleven
SHARE countries, the nationwide public smoking bans was the Netherlands in 2002.
Subsequently, Austria, Italy, and Sweden introduced comprehensive bans in 2005;
Spain and Belgium in 2006; France and Denmark in 2007. With the federal system,
Germany introduced smoking bans at state level starting in 2007 and had it nationwide
by 2009. The last SHARE country to enact public smoking bans was Greece in 2010.
Table 2.1 outlines the timing of SHARE interviews and smoke-free legislation
introduction in each country with smoking bans categorized into three types: bans in
public spaces, workplaces, and restaurants and bars. More details on the legislation
of smoking bans by country, including their comprehensiveness and exemptions, are
presented in appendix, table A-1.
Summary statistics on the demographic make-up of respondents is in Table 2.2
shows that respondents in countries that introduced smoking bans early, before 2007,
are older on average, and more likely living with a partner. Regression analysis
controlling for demographic variables address the possible biases from differences in
two groups.
3.2.3 Identification strategy
Initial analysis treats all the smoking bans as equivalent, measuring the effect of
comprehensive smoking bans on overall level of smoking behavior. Thereafter, model
will refine smoking bans according to its coverage and its heterogeneous effects on
smokers with various smoking intensity and the level of exposure to smoking bans at
workplaces with employment information.
Given the timing of smoke-free legislations, the preliminary analysis is based on
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the first two waves of SHARE: years 2004 and 2006. The effect of smoking bans is
measured by comparing the changes of smoking behavior in the countries that smoking
bans were imposed between SHARE interviews wave 1 and 2 to changes in smoking
behavior in the countries that smoking bans were imposed after the SHARE interview
wave 2 in 2006. Samples from the Netherlands were dropped as their smoking bans
were introduced before the first SHARE interview. Countries with a comprehensive
ban introduced between SHARE interviews wave 1 and wave 2 include Austria, Italy,
Sweden, Spain and Belgium. On the other hand, the comparison countries with
comprehensive bans introduced after both wave 1 and wave 2 interviews include
France, Denmark, Germany and Greece.
The outcome measures for smoking behavior are whether a respondent is a current
smoker at the time of interview; and if current smoker, the smoking intensity, which is
the average number of cigarettes smoked per day. The smoking status are determined
by two questions: first, “Have you ever smoked cigarettes, cigars, cigarillos or a pipe
daily for a period of at least one year?” and second, “Do you smoke at the present
time?” If they ever smoked daily, they are asked, “How many cigarettes [do/did] you
smoke on average per day?” Unfortunately, data on smoking intensity is not available
after wave 2. Therefore, the analysis on the changes in smoking intensity among
continued smokers is limited to only the short-run effects.
The two-period model estimates short-run effects of smoking bans within a two-year
window after the enactment. However, with only two periods, the estimated effects
could be influenced by coincidental state-year shocks that happened concurrently with
the policy intervention. Subsequently, SHARE interviews in 2011 and 2013 are added
to the analysis. The additional SHARE interviews not only allowed for subsequent
durations of ten years after smoking bans, multiple countries-periods data are also
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more robust to possible state-year shocks that could confound the effect of interested
policy intervention. Furthermore, additional periods will facilitate the estimation of
country-time trend that represent country-specific trend for checking robustness of
DID estimates.
3.2.4 Empirical Models
3.2.4.1 Short-Run Effects
DID regressions with two period data is
Yist = γs + λt + βDst +X
′
istδ + εist, t = 1or2.
The difference-in-differences estimates measure the effect of national legislation on
smoking bans in public spaces. Dst is a comprehensive ban indicator, equal to 1 if
there is a smoke-free legislation in place in country s at time t, and otherwise 0. Yist
is the outcome measures of smoking behavior: smoking status and smoking intensity.
The smoking status indicator is equal to 1 if a respondent smokes daily at time t,
and 0 otherwise. For smokers, smoking intensity is equal to the average number of
cigarettes smoked per day at time t, where t is either 1 or 2.
The key identifying assumption for DID estimates to have causal implication is that
the trend in smoking would have been the same in both groups in the absence of the
policy intervention. If the trend of smoking behavior among mature smokers in each
country influences the timing of legislation, the estimations will suffer endogeneity bias
then the claim about the causality of smoking bans on changes in smoking behavior
cannot be made. If the pre-existed trend in smoking prevalence is declining and leads
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to early smoke-free legislation, DID estimates of the effect of smoking bans on smoking
behavior will be biased upwards.
As discussed above, the European Commission’s Recommendation and the adoption
of FCTC, to a degree, dictated the passage of nationwide smoking bans that eventually
was made in every country in the sample by 2010. The timing of legislation, which
is the essential part of research design, was politically influenced by public attitudes
towards the harm of secondhand smoke rather than by smoking prevalence among
older population. It is the shift in attitudes towards smoking and secondhand smoke
that mobilize and precede smoking ban legislations. However, the trend in smoking
behavior among mature smokers is less influenced by the shifts in public attitudes
among younger smokers due to the generation gap and their well-established addiction.
Figure ?? and Figure 35 review the relationship between the passage of smoke-free
legislations with smoking prevalence, and public attitudes toward public smoking bans
and secondhand smoke.
There is not a clear relationship between smoking behavior and the passage of
smoke-free legislation, while public attitudes toward secondhand smoke and towards
smoking bans are more influential to the timing of legislation. Figure 1 displays
country profiles on smoking prevalence, attitudes towards secondhand smokes, and
smoking behavior in each country, comparing the group with early introduction of
smoking bans to the group with late introduction. Countries are presented in order of
the date of their first national comprehensive smoking bans. The variations of smoking
prevalence and smoking behaviors of smokers are similar in both groups. While looking
at population smoking prevalence, there is a u-shape relationship between the passage
of smoke-free legislation and smoking prevalence. However, such relationship is not
present with smoking prevalence of mature smokers (Figure 34a.
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Smoking behavior of smokers, whether they smoke at home, smoke in a car if alone,
and smoke in a car if with non-smokers, distributed equally in two groups (Fig. 1-2).
Attitudes towards the harm of secondhand smoke are also similar. There is an inverted
u-shape trend in the percent of people who think secondhand smoke can cause serious
illnesses, such as cancer, in the long term. This perception is relevant with how active
the medical community is in educating the population about the harm of smoking
and the level of activism in each country. For public attitudes towards smoking bans,
both groups have similar attitudes towards smoking bans in restaurants, offices and
workplaces, and indoor public spaces. However, public attitudes supporting bans in
bars or pubs are higher in countries with earlier bans.
Because nationwide smoke-free legislations are aggregate at the country level, the
country fixed effect is essential in addressing omitted variable bias when evaluating
the policy. Other intangible factors such as attitudes towards smoking bans determine
how much bans influence smoking decision. Conjunction tobacco policies are also
critical and could have complementary effects on smoking bans (Levy, Chaloupka
and Gitchell, 2004). Six main tobacco control strategies include public smoking bans,
taxation, advertisement bans, health warning labels, supporting services for quitting,
and public information campaign. Since it is hard to quantify these intangible factors,
country fixed-effects, , are crucial in isolating the effect of smoking bans from preceding
trends in smoking and other concurrent tobacco control policies at the country level.
A time fixed effect, , represents transnational trends that influenced all the countries.
Sample attrition and omitted variable problems could bias DID estimates. For
robustness check, a comparable analysis on a balanced sample is examined, and the
individual-level fixed effects are included to address the possible omitted variable
problem in panel data. Examining a balanced subsample offers the benefits of getting
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rid of between variation and isolating changes in smoking behavior to only within
variation for a respondent. The smaller sample size of a balanced subsample, however,
leads to less precise estimates. More importantly, the results are more sensitive to
measurement errors. The measurement errors in the outcome measures could be
due to respondents giving wrong answers or interviewers making a mistake keying in
answers. Possible measurement errors are spotted in data, for instance, nonsmokers in
wave 1 becomes smokers in wave 2, and resume to being a non smoker, which is quite
irregular for a person at older age to pick up smoking habits and quit. The changes
in smoking status could be either a relapse or measurement errors. To address the
problem, some analyses include only those reported as smokers in wave 1 to rule out
measurement errors for respondents that reported being nonsmokers and picked up
smoking in the middle.
3.2.4.2 Long-Term Effects
The effects of smoking bans could be different in the short term and long term.
This section extends the two-period model to four periods and explores a different
specification of smoking ban variables in order to relax the assumption that the effect
of bans is discrete and instantaneous. The annex of SHARE wave 4 and 5 resulted in a
total of four periods, 2004, 2006, 2011, and 2013. SHARE wave 3 consists of different
modules that do not contain relevant variables and hence excluded. All the countries
in the sample introduced a comprehensive smoking ban nationwide by the interview
in 2013. In this setting, all the countries are ‘treated’ and there is no separation
of treatment and control groups, and hence relaxing the ‘parallel trend’ assumption
required between two groups in DID estimations. Moreover, data with additional
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periods is more robust to possible state-year shocks that potentially confound the
effect of smoking bans in the two-period model. The OLS probability estimation of
being a smoker at time t is:
Yist = γs + λt + βDurationist +X
′
istδ + εist, t = 1, 2, 3, or4.
where indexes countries. The outcome measure is smoking status, whether respon-
dent i is a smoker at time t. Since the availability of smoking intensity data is limited
to only two periods, the analyses on changes in smoking intensity among continued
smokers are limited to only the short-term effects. Durationist is the number of years
from the time a comprehensive smoking ban was introduced in country s to the time
when the respondent i is interviewed at time t, and is equal to zero if the time of
interview is before comprehensive bans were introduced. Durationist captures the
impact of smoking bans over time after the introduction where time is measured in
months and scaled to a year unit. The coefficient β is equivalent to changes in the
probability of outcomes one year after comprehensive bans are introduced. Under this
specification, it is assumed that the effect of smoking bans is linear and continuous
over the population; and the longer the bans are in place, the more likely a smoker
will quit smoking. Analyses of models with the ban indicator variable Dist are still
carried out in comparison to the ban variable Durationist. Different functional forms
of Durationist can also be explored. Additionally, having more than two periods
allows for the estimation of country-time trend, and the inclusion and exclusion of
country-time trend variables for robustness check. With this ban specification, the
population difference-in-differences is
E[Yist|s = E, t = K]−E[Yist|s = E, t = J ]−E[Yist|s = L, t = K]−E[Yist|s = L, t = J ]
= β[(DurationiEK −DurationiEJ)− (DurationiLK −DurationiLJ)].
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Suppose compare Austria, an early ban introducer in 2005, and Greece, a
late ban introducer in 2010, the population difference-in-differences is equal to
βDurationAustria,2 (omitting i for a representative respondent), while the population
difference-in-differences between time period one and three is β(DurationAustria,3 −
DurationGreece,3). The coefficient β can be interpreted as the reduction of smoking
prevalence in the sample each year after a comprehensive ban is introduced assuming
that the effect is linear.
3.2.4.3 Smoking Intensity
Besides varying effects of smoking bans over time in the short run and long
run, the effects can also differ over spaces where it was imposed. Smoking bans
can be categorized into three main types according to its coverage: 1) workplaces,
2) public spaces, and 3) hospitality establishments. Public spaces include public
transports, public building, educational establishments and healthcare facilities, while
hospitality establishments include restaurants, bars, cafes and hotels. Workplace bans
are expected to be the most influential on the employees as they spend a majority of
their time there. Note that two types of bans could intersect. For example, smoking
bans in public transports, which is a ban in public spaces, also apply to those working
in public transport facilities, hence a form of workplace smoking ban.
3.2.4.4 Workplace Bans
The probability of quitting or changed smoking behavior depends on the exposure
of smokers to smoking bans and how strict the bans are. Workplaces will likely
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have high impact for employed smokers as they spend a majority of their days at
workplaces. Smoking bans in public spaces will affect almost everyone but probably
not to a great extent as time spent in public establishments may not account for much
each day. Meanwhile, smoking bans in restaurants and cafes may affect those dining
out more often while bans in bars affect smokers who frequent bars and habitually
smoke while drinking. Individual data can address the heterogeneity in the exposure
to smoking bans and potential heterogeneity in the effects; for example, identification
of employment status, industries in which being employed, and the number of hours
worked each week which would lead to varied levels of exposure to bans.
3.3 Results
The analyses begin with two-wave data to investigate the short-term effects within
two years after a smoking ban, and extended to the analysis for the long-term effects,
spanning over nine years after comprehensive bans are implemented. In the short-term
analysis, heterogeneity in likelihood of smoking cessation among smokers with different
smoking intensity is compared in the short run and long run. Moreover, heterogeneity
in the effects of bans over respondents with different employment profiles is examined.
3.3.1 Difference-in-Differences tables
Table 3.1 presents smoking prevalence among respondents in the SHARE sample,
for the overall samples, countries where smoking bans were introduced before SHARE
wave 2, and comparison countries where smoking bans were introduced after SHARE
wave 2. The top row shows that overall smoking prevalence declined by 0.86 percent
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from wave 1 to wave 2, or a 4.52 percent decline in the number of smokers from
previously 19.94 percent smoking prevalence in wave 1.
Row 2 and 3 show that smoking prevalence declined in both groups, while the
group that introduced smoking bans earlier have higher reduction in smoking rate.
Smoking prevalence significantly declined by 1.33 percent in countries that imposed
smoking bans by 2006. This is equivalent to a 7.85 percent reduction in the number
of smokers from the previous smoking prevalence of 16.93 percent. On the other
hand, smoking prevalence did not significantly decline in countries that imposed
smoking bans later. Their smoking prevalence lowered by 0.51 percent on average,
which is equivalent to 2.48 percent reduction from the previous smoking prevalence
of 20.43 percent. This is consistent with the hypothesis that smoking bans also have
added effects in reducing smoking prevalence. The bottom row shows estimated
differences in smoking prevalence between the two groups. The early group has lower
smoking prevalence than the late group in both wave 1 and wave 2 by 3.51 percent
and 4.33 percent respectively. The estimated difference-in-differences as a result of
comprehensive smoking bans is 0.08 percent in smoking reduction (p > 0.10). This
shows that comprehensive smoking bans had a modest but statistically insignificant
impact on smoking prevalence.
3.3.2 DID regression analysis
3.3.2.1 Short-term Effects
The analysis up to now has not controlled for possible country-specific and
individual-specific characteristics. Different public attitude and related tobacco control
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policies predictably influence the effectiveness of smoking bans in reducing tobacco
consumption. Furthermore, smoking ban policy is aggregate at the country level;
therefore the country fixed effects are essential in addressing other possible confounding
effects. The time fixed effects capture transnational trends of smoking prevalence
across countries. To address the correlation in the group error terms that may lead
to understated standard errors and ‘placebo’ significant effect addressed in Bertrand
et. al 2004, standard errors are clustered by the NUTS (nomenclature of territorial
units for statistics) classification level 1. Due to the small number of countries in
the sample, only 9 clusters, NUTS classification is opted to more accurately reflect
local culture, norms, and public policies at the regional level, as well as to refine the
cluster level. Due to confidentiality issues, NUTS level 2 and 3 are not available in
some SHARE countries; hence NUTS1 is chosen as the clustering unit. Demographic
control variables including age, gender, college attainment, employment, and living
status with a partner are included in all regression analyses. Moreover, individual
fixed effects are included and excluded in specifications for robustness check.
Table 3.2 compares the OLS probability estimations of respondents being smokers
in wave 1 and 2 under different specifications in models I to V. The results in Model
I, which includes demographic control variables, time fixed effects, group fixed effects,
remain largely the same with simple DID estimates; the introduction of comprehensive
smoking bans led to a reduction of 0.08 percent (p >.10) in smoking prevalence.
With the inclusion of country fixed effects (model II), the estimates are smaller and
not statistically significant. With the inclusion of individual fixed effects to control
for possible omitted variables that correlates with regressors, smoking prevalence is
estimated to lower by 1.43 percent (p>.10) due to comprehensive smoking bans for
both unbalanced (model III) and balanced samples (using first difference estimator
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in model IV). Given that 19.05 percent of the sample is smokers in wave 1, the
reduction of 1.43 percent in smoking prevalence is equivalent to 7.42 percent in
smoking cessation among mature smokers due to the introduction of comprehensive
smoking bans. Estimates under the hypothesis that individual effects are random
(model V) yield similar results.
The effect of smoking bans on cigarette consumption per day for continued smokers
is estimated in model VI using OLS estimates with the number of cigarettes as a
dependent variable and assuming individual fixed effects. The result reveals that on
average continued smokers reduced cigarette consumption by 1.39 cigarettes per day
from wave 1 to wave 2, while the introduction of smoking bans led to an additional
reduction of 0.13 cigarettes per day, or equivalently an additional 10 percent reduction
in smoking intensity from the pre-existed trend. The result is consistent with previous
studies. Reviews on population-based worksite studies found between a 7 percent
and 15 percent reduction in cigarettes smoked (Woodruff and Pierce, 1993; Glasgow
et al., 1997; Evans et al., 1999; Farkas et al., 1999). The Large standard error on the
effect of smoking bans suggest that the impact could be heterogeneous among smokers
with different smoking intensity level, which lead to the next analysis of the effects on
smokers with varied smoking intensity.
3.3.2.2 Long-Term Effects
This section extends the 2-period DID model to four periods from 2004 to 2013.
By 2010, all countries in the sample had legislated smoke-free laws, hence the concept
of “treatment” and “control” countries is expendable in this setting. Alternative
representation of smoking bans using the time duration between the bans and time of
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interview is also introduced to relax the assumption that the effect of smoking bans
on smoking behaviors is instantaneous and discrete. One could think of the effect
of smoking bans as continuous and leading to lower smoking prevalence over time.
In contrary, the effect could even be transient and there is a reversion in smoking
behavior after a period of time. The availability of data for longer period of time
yields enough variation in the time duration variable. The duration of time after
bans to represent the effects can reveal a linear trend in the effects of bans over time,
while adding the quadratic term of the ban duration variable can test the hypothesis
whether there is a diminishing or increasing returns in the effect of smoking bans.
Using a subsample of smokers in wave 1 who were also interviewed in subsequent
waves, Table 3.4 shows OLS probability estimations of the likelihood that smokers in
wave 1 continued to be smokers in subsequent waves. The OLS probability estimation
with a binary bans variable concludes that mature smokers are 6.96 percent more
likely to quit smoking as a result of comprehensive bans in the long term. Using
the ban duration as the smoking bans variable shows that smokers are 2.72 percent
(p<.05) more likely to quit smoking each year after comprehensive smoking bans,
conditional on control variables including time fixed effects, country fixed effects, and
demographic variables. In the absence of the bans, smokers in wave 1 have 16 percent
probability of quitting in wave 2; while they are 6.96 percent more likely to quit
smoking with smoking bans policy intervention (Model I).
Testing for diminishing marginal returns in the effect of smoking bans on smoking
prevalence over time by including the quadratic terms (column III) shows that the ban
could have diminishing returns over time, but the diminishing return is small and not
statistically different from zero (coefficient is equal to 0.0002; p>.10). Models IV-VI
show estimates with the inclusion of individual fixed effect variables with different
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estimators for individual fixed effects or individual random effects. The results are
robust across all estimators.
Smoking bans lead to higher smoking cessation among light and heavy smokers
while leaving average smokers largely unaffected, as illustrated in Figure 3.1. Figure 3.1
compares the short-term and long-term effects of smoking bans, which were estimated
from the two-period subsample and four-period subsample respectively. In both the
short run and long run, light and heavy smokers are most likely to quit after smoking
bans. In the short run, very light smokers, those smoking less than 5 cigarettes per day,
are more likely to quit, and if they did not quit within the first two years, the chance
of them quitting are lower in the long run. In contrary, the probability of quitting
among chain smokers, those smoking more than 40 cigarettes per day, increase in
the long run after smoking bans. In the long run, light smokers, smoking less than
15 cigarettes per day, are estimated to be about 6 to10 percent more likely to quit
as a result of smoking bans (Table 3.5). Meanwhile, the effects of smoking bans on
average and heavy smokers, those smoking between 16 to 40 cigarettes per day, are
not significantly different form zero at the 5 percent confidence level (Table 3.5).
3.3.2.3 Workplace Ban
In the long run, workplace bans could lead to as high as additional 4.59 percent
reduction in smoking prevalence, conditional on other types of bans; while general
comprehensive bans lead to a 2.03 percent reduction in smoking prevalence (Table
3.6, Model I). Given that 28 percent of the sample is employed, employees are 16.39
percent less likely to smoke following a workplace ban conditional on the presence
of other smoking bans. The effects of different types of smoking bans are expected
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to be complementary to each other. Model II (Table 3.6) is the OLS probability
estimation of being a smoker given employment in different industries, including
hospitality, transportation, public administration, education, health, and community-
related industries. Industries with the most comprehensive workplace bans are health,
education, and transportation to ensure smoke-free environment for patients, children,
and public transport users (European Commission, 2013). Model II shows that
workplace bans resulted in a 9.06 percent (p<.05) and 4.99 percent (p<.05) reduction
in the likelihood of being a smoker for those working in transportation, and health and
social work sectors. The highest reduction in smoking prevalence rate is consistent
with where the regulations are enforced most strictly and comprehensively. Those
employed in restaurant industries also reported 2.53 percent (p>.10) less likely to
smoke after smoking bans while those employed in the education sector are 2.42
percent less likely to smoke (p>.10) (Table 3.6 (II)).
Smoking among those working in restaurants and education sectors reduced on
average after workplace bans; however the large standard errors could be contributed
by the fact that there are exceptions in these establishments, leading to high variation
in the results. Comprehensiveness of smoking bans for those employed in the restaurant
and hospitality sectors are also subjected to the policy on smoking bans in restaurants
and bars. For educational establishments, most countries imposed strict smoking
bans. However, some countries allow for smoking rooms for teaching personals. For
some, smoking is completely banned in lower education institutions, while smoking or
smoking rooms are allowed in higher education institutions (European Commission,
2013). This confirms that more comprehensive bans more effectively increases smoking
cessation among the employed while exceptions in smoking bans lead to harder
implementation and less impact on smoking reduction.
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How much time spent at work is also influential to the likelihood of quitting after
workplace bans. Table 3.7 shows estimates of the probability to smoke conditional on
employment status and hours working each week with the subsample of all respondents.
Those spending more time at work are less likely to be a smoker subsequent to workplace
bans. Subsequent to workplace bans, those working 41 to 60 hours per week are
4.54 percent less likely to smoke than others (Table 3.7 (I-II)). However, there is a
diminishing return for those working 60 hours or more; smoking bans become less
effective in curbing their smoking behavior. This could be due the correlation in the
number of hours worked for employees to the type of jobs or workplaces. Jobs with
more hours could be more stressful and smoking cigarettes becomes more valuable to
relieve stress, as nicotine is a natural relaxant. Further investigation could be done
to probe into whether the stress level of jobs correlates with the number of hours at
work each week. Moreover, whether workplace bans lead to unintended consequences
of increased anxiety or mental distress could be explored.
3.4 Robustness Check
Add robustness check results, including regressions on randomized treatments, and
median regression for the heavy smokers.
3.5 Conclusions
Smoking bans lead to smoking reduction and cessation among smokers. The results
do not show a reversion in smoking rate in the long run, indicating that changes in
smoking behavior persist after the bans. There is heterogeneity in the effect of smoking
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bans depending on respondents’ exposure to smoking bans. Those working in places
with more comprehensive bans are less likely to smoking subsequent to workplace bans
and likewise for those spending longer time at work. There is an increasing returns
in the effects of bans on the hours spent at work with diminishing return after more
than 60 hours work per week. Lower smoking prevalence in both the short run and
long run also implies that smokers who quit did not displace their smoking to private
spaces. However, smoking displacement is possible for those that did not quit.
When smokers are classified by the level of smoking intensity at the baseline
interview, smoking bans are shown to be effective in increasing smoking cessation
among light smokers and very heavy smokers; while showing no statistically different
effects among average smokers. Chances of quitting among chain smokers increases in
the long run, while the chances of quitting among light smokers declined after two
years following smoking bans.
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3.6 Tables
Year of first Smoking prevalence
Country comprehensive bans 1995 2002 2005
The Netherlands 2004 43.5 42.5 30
Austria 2005 32.5 39 42
Italy 2005 32.5 35 30
Sweden 2005 30 33.5 20
Spain 2006 36 40.5 32
Belgium 2006 38 34 28
France 2007 32.5 44 33
Denmark 2007 47 42.5 35
Germany 2008 29.5 36.5 32
Greece 2010 40 42 43
Source: Eurobarometer 2002, 2006
Table 12: Population Smoking Prevalence in SHARE Countries
Characteristics Overall Smokers Nonsmokers
Average SD
Observations 30,804 5,912 24,732
Age 63.86 10.58 59.46 64.92
Living with a partner 0.75 0.43 0.75 0.75
Male 0.44 0.50 0.54 0.42
College 0.19 0.39 0.19 0.19
Employed 0.29 0.46 0.41 0.27
Income 3,966 134,318 2,373 4,523
(observations) (7923) (2052) (5870)
Source: SHARE wave 1
Table 13: Demographic Characteristics of SHARE Subsample in Wave 1
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Pre Bans Post Bans P-value
All countries
Age 61.99 59.18 0.0001
Male 0.44 0.45 0.4934
Employed 0.29 0.27 0.0341
Graduated college 0.23 0.21 0.3600
Living with a partner 0.65 0.36 0.0000
Early Bans
Age 65.07 60.07 0.0000
Male 0.44 0.45 0.1938
Employed 0.26 0.23 0.3166
Graduated college 0.13 0.16 0.0763
Living with a partner 0.74 0.40 0.0000
Late Bans
Age 61.25 57.57 0.0000
Male 0.45 0.45 0.6550
Employed 0.30 0.33 0.1291
Graduated college 0.25 0.29 0.3045
Living with a partner 0.63 0.29 0.0000
Number of observations 52179 86739
Source: SHARE wave 1, 2, 4, and 5
Table 14: Summary Statistics from Pre and Post bans in 2004-2013
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Smoking Status Short run Long run
Subsample: smokers wave 1 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Comprehensive Bans -0.085*** -0.077** -0.070*** -0.077*** -0.065***
(0.026) (0.032) (0.021) (0.028) (0.022)
Wave 2 -0.156*** -0.161*** -0.159***
(0.021) (0.020) (0.021)
Wave 4 -0.273*** -0.268***
(0.021) (0.022)
Wave 5 -0.342*** -0.339***
(0.026) (0.031)
Country fixed effects Yes No Yes No Yes
Country trend Yes Yes
Individual fixed effects No No No No Yes
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 7593 7593 10904 10904 10904
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis, clustered by NUTS level 1
*** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** 5 percent level, and * 10 percent level
Table 15: OLS Regressions on Short Run and Long-Run Smoking Cessation Rates
Smoking intensity N Percent
0 to 5 1,470 13.9
6 to 10 2,156 20.4
11 to 15 1,823 17.3
16 to 20 2,553 24.2
21 to 25 731 6.9
26 to 30 547 5.2
31 to 35 673 6.4
36 to 40 433 4.1
more than 40 173 1.6
Total 10,559 100
Source: SHARE wave 1
Table 16: Summary Statistics of Cigarette Consumption Per Day of Smokers in Wave
1
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Employment Number of observations Percent
Retired or unemployed 84,827 72.76
Employed 32,336 27.24
-Services 7,414 30.54
-Manufacturing 5,258 21.33
-Health 3,476 14.28
-Others or don’t know 10,397 10.54
-Education 2,392 9.69
-Public Administration 2,178 8.63
-Transportation 1,221 4.99
Total 117,163 100
Source: SHARE wave 1
Table 17: Employment Status by Industry of SHARE Sample in Wave 1
Smoking Prevalence
Sample Wave1 Wave2 Differences
All groups 0.1905 0.1819 -0.0086***
(.0115) (.0128) (0.003)
Bans before wave 2 0.1693 0.1560 -0.0133**
(.0039) (.0060) (0.0057)
Bans after wave 2 0.2044 0.1993 -0.0051
(.0172) (.0174) (0.0033)
Difference
-0.0351* -0.0433** -0.0082
(0.0175) (0.0184) (0.0065)
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis, clustered by NUTS level 1 (56 clusters).
*** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** 5 percent level, and * 10 percent level
Table 18: Difference-in-differences of Smoking Prevalence in 2004 and 2006
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Numbers of cigarettes Changes in no. of Percent change of Number of
smoked in wave 1 cig in wave 2 no. of cig in wave 2 Observation
0 to 5 -1.2522** (0.5583) -0.1895 (0.1326) 263
6 to 10 -0.8973 (0.5541) -0.0662 (0.0398) 463
11 to 15 -0.0591 (0.5191) -0.0041 (0.0209) 395
16 to 20 0.3745 (0.6154) 0.0117 (0.0183) 596
21 to 25 -0.9289 (0.9482) -0.0347 (0.0353) 194
26 to 30 -0.9222 (1.0987) -0.0405 (0.0285) 144
31 to 35 2.2674 (5.3075) 0.0342 (0.1037) 20
36 to 40 -2.5761 (1.9132) -0.0365 (0.0341) 124
more than 40 -34.1899** (15.6767) -0.3146* (0.1571) 51
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis, clustered by NUTS level 1
*** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** 5 percent level, and * 10 percent level
Table 20: Changes in Cigarette Consumption in 2004 and 2006 after Smoking Bans,
for Smokers with Varying Smoking Intensity in Wave 1
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Dependent Variable: Cessation rate Prevalence rate
Smoking status (I) (II) (III) (IV)
Comphrehensive Bans -0.065*** -0.065*** -0.011 -0.011
(0.021) (0.021) (0.010) (0.010)
Bans at workplace X employed -0.034 -0.044**
(0.023) (0.018)
Workplace bans X Industry
-Manufacturing -0.068 -0.043*
(0.072) (0.024)
-Transportation -0.219** -0.098**
(0.087) (0.046)
-Health -0.106 -0.056**
(0.072) (0.024)
-Education -0.097 -0.019
(0.071) (0.023)
-Public Admin -0.056 0.023
(0.082) (0.028)
-Services 0.022 -0.022
(0.050) (0.020)
-Others or don’t know -0.019 -0.051**
(0.025) (0.020)
Controls
Gender, age, education, living with
partner, and work industry, time,
and country fixed effects
Number of observations 10904 10904 116169 116169
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis, clustered by NUTS level 1
*** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** 5 percent level, and * 10 percent level
Table 23: Regressions of the Effects of Workplace Bans on Different Industries
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3.7 Figures
Figure 29: Comparison of Smoking Prevalence in the EU Population Between Countries
with Early and Late Bans
114
Figure 30: Smoking Prevalence in SHARE Sample
design.png
Figure 31: Timing of Smoking Bans and SHARE Interviews
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Figure 32: Research Design: Maps of SHARE Countries with Smoking Bans in
2004-2010
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Figure 33: Histogram of Average Cigarette Consumption Per Day of Smokers from
SHARE Wave 1
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(a) Smoking Prevalence from SHARE Sample and Country Pop-
ulation
(b) Smoking Behaviors of Smokers Reported by Eurobarometer
in 2004
Figure 34: Smoking Prevalence and Behaviors in 2004
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(a) Attitudes Towards Secondhand Smoke
(b) Public Attitudes Towards Smoking Bans
Figure 35: Attitudes Towards Smoking Bans and Secondhand Smoke in SHARE
Countries Reported by Eurobarometer in 2004
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Figure 36: Changes in Number of Cigarettes Smoked Per Day in the Short Run
Figure 37: Probability of Smoking Cessation After Comprehensive Bans in the Short
Run and Long Run
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APPENDIX A
SURVEY OF COMPUTATION METHODS
126
A.1 Reviews
This appendix offers a survey of model solution computation techniques from rele-
vant studies to Chapter 2, including Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2011), Kaplan
and Violante (2014), Berger and Vavra (2015), Berger et al. (2018), and Druedahl
and Jørgensen (2017). These papers consider a class of household consumption and
saving model with two assets, liquid and illiquid assets, when transaction costs in
accessing or adjusting the illiquid account are present. Two-asset models are shown to
match household consumption decision significantly better than the standard one-asset
model. This class of model, however, is computationally expensive to solve and the
fact that these models only appear later in the literature is owing to computational
advances. Computational techniques used in relevant studies to solve their models are
briefly summarized in the table below.
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Author Within-Period
Solution
Value function
calculation
Fernandez-Villaverde and
Krueger (2011)
Search on grid of
durables, and perform
Quasi-Newton search on
asset holding conditional
on durable. If close to
borrowing constraints,
use bisection method.
Approximation: Linear or
bilinear interpolation
Kaplan and Violante
(2014)
Convert solution into
indirect utility form, and
derive FOCs and
Envelope’s conditions to
solve for Euler’s equation.
Solve problem in two
stages: 1) total
expenditure for each
period, and 2)
within-period
nondurables vs. service
flow of durables
Direct calculation using
Envelope’s conditions and
other FOCs.
Berger and Vavra (2015)
and Berger et al. (2018)
Search two-dimensional
solution using
Nelder-Meade algorithm,
starting from 3 different
values to prevent finding
local maximum
Approximation with
multi-linear functions in
continuous idiosyncratic
states and one continuous
aggregate state.
Druedahl and Jørgensen
(2017)
Endogenous grid method Direct calculation:
Envelope’s conditions.
Table 24: Review of Computation Methods of Dynamic Models with Two Assets and
Adjustment Costs
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